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I.  INTRODUCTION: WHY INTEREST? A PREFACE 
Despite its complexities, inconsistencies, and somewhat chaotic 
development, the international income tax regime (IITR) has never 
fulfilled the fire and brimstone prophecies many claimed it would. 
Imposing only insignificant barriers to trade and investment, the IITR 
has allowed international commerce among industrialized countries 
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with inconsequential incidences of double taxation.1 Because it is 
premised on the “source rules,” which allocate revenue from different 
economic activities to different jurisdictions, it is surprising that the 
IITR has never been fundamentally challenged. These rules are 
convoluted, detached from the economic concept of income, and 
devoid of any well theorized normative content.2 To unfold this 
apparent inconsistency — between the IITR’s smooth operation and 
blemished source premise — this article reviews critically the 
economic and intellectual history of one of the IITR’s most important 
sourcing conventions: the source tax treatment of interest payments. 
Allocation of interest income has always been an important issue 
because of the business community’s interest in preventing tax 
obstacles from interfering with the “smooth” flow of international 
debt investments. Despite its ongoing importance for both capital 
importing and exporting countries, sourcing rules dealing with interest 
have been somewhat ambiguous as to the tax owed by the creditor to 
the debtor’s jurisdiction. Even though they have elicited numerous 
controversies, these ambiguities have not been fully resolved during 
the course of the last eighty-five years. One aspect of the article’s 
contribution is focusing on the very significant interest source rules 
and tracing their development over a long period of time. However, 
its main contribution transcends the importance of the interest source 
rules. Due to their ongoing importance and ambiguity, the sourcing 
conventions of interest income have been constantly changed through 
the years, each change subscribing to the different ideological premise 
of its era. Accordingly, the development of these sourcing conventions 
serves as an example that reflects the IITR’s development as a whole. 
The article traces the historical development of the IITR — a 
synthesis of two more commonly told 20th century historic processes. 
The first is the history of globalization — a process induced by 
Western countries to restore the high pre-WWI levels of market 
integration. The second is the history of the income tax — and the 
reliance of Western countries on income tax revenues since WWI. The 
source rules are the friction point between these two stories. The 
economic concept of income refers to the net increase in individuals’ 
wealth during a given period, pooling individuals’ resources to 
 
 1 Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 269 (2001). 
 2 H. David Rosenbloom, U.S. Source Rules: Building Blocks of Cross-Border 
Taxation, 60 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 386 (2006) (providing an 
illuminating analysis over the function of the source rules in the international income 
tax regime (IITR)). 
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determine their ability to bear the tax burden. In contrast, the source 
rules bifurcate individuals’ income to different jurisdictions, hence 
importing a divisional element into income tax administration that is 
alien to the notion of income as the net gain of individuals’ total 
wealth.3 The growing levels of economic integration in global markets 
require increasingly the use of source rules, hence making the tension 
between the notion of income tax and globalization palpable and 
inevitable. This article provides readers with an insight into the 
dynamics by which many international source tax rules and 
conventions have developed. IITR policy is an extension of foreign 
policy and fiscal policy, each representing a compromise among 
multiple considerations. Because of this, the development of IITR 
policy has always been perceived as somewhat erratic and 
discontinuous. As a result, with only few exceptions,4 it has never been 
adequately researched and theorized. 
The article demonstrates that an erratic vision is flawed, and that 
one may track dominant themes underlying the IITR’s development. 
The article demonstrates how, over the past eighty-five years, these 
themes were subject to changes that corresponded with the political 
economy of cross-border businesses and transactions. To illustrate 
this, it creates three novel chronological stages of development: the 
Revenue, Trade, and Anti-Avoidance Phases. In each of these phases, 
the article focuses on the major crossroads in the development of U.S. 
sourcing rules in the U.S. IITR that, due to the dominant economic 
position of the United States, are the most influential IITR in the 
examined era. The article examines U.S. sourcing rules by looking at 
two different elements that developed in different phases. The first is 
U.S. double taxation treaty policy and its resonance with other 
significant treaty policies of international organizations with regard to 
withholding taxes on interest payments. The second element is the 
U.S. earnings-stripping regime (USESR). 
The upshot of the article’s historical analysis transcends the value 
of elucidating this specific issue alone. It highlights a more general and 
multilayered story of source tax erosion that has not yet been told. 
 
 3 Jugh J. Ault & David F. Brandford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis 
of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 31 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemord eds., 1990). 
 4 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. 
International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313 (2005); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. 
O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021 
(1997); Richard Vann, Tax Treaties: The Secret Agent’s Secrets, 50 BRIT. TAX REV. 345 
(2006). 
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The thesis that emerges is that the themes that have dominated the 
IITR debate are fundamentally insufficient for dealing with material 
changes in an integrated global economy. More specifically, the article 
argues that fiscal and equitable considerations played too small a role 
in the development of the IITR. The article suggests that notions of 
liberalizing cross-border trade and investment have infiltrated the 
debate in an unbalanced and hazardous way, leading to a severe 
erosion of the income tax base. It further argues that the anti-
avoidance strategy, which sought to balance trade considerations by 
re-characterizing transactions that might be identified as abusive, was 
unable to prevent fiscal losses, resulting in immense costs and 
inefficiencies. In my opinion, such paradigmatic failures explain the 
present IITR’s inadequate performance at the outset of the 21st 
century. One cannot underestimate the impact of this failure because, 
as the 21st century begins, residence income taxation is under siege.5 
There is a growing readiness among policymakers in dominant 
economies to shift to a territorial system that exempts residents’ 
foreign income. This suggests that whether or not one believes that 
taxation at source is justified, the source rules are the de facto arena in 
which many future tax battles are going to be won or lost.6 
The article provides an historical analysis that is necessary for 
better informed policy research. It urges scholars and policymakers to 
create a new phase in IITR development that contains new source 
allocation conventions. It argues that, based on material changes in 
the world economy and the inadequacy of current sourcing rules to 
efficiently and equitably deal with the proceeds of financial 
investments, the sourcing rules of an emerging new phase will have to 
depart from prevalent source rule classifications of financial 
investments. 
Part II of the article contextualizes the tax environment in which 
financial transactions are employed. It does so by exploring the legal 
and economic terrain in which such transactions take place. 
Afterwards, it carefully defines the scope of the article’s inquiry. Part 
III describes the first phase in the intellectual development of the 
IITR — the Revenue Phase. During this phase, from the 1920s until 
the end of WWII, revenue considerations played the major role in 
IITR formulation. As the article later argues, it is surprising to see 
 
 5 Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the ‘Unsourceable’: The Cost Sharing Regulations 
and the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangibles-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 
633–35 (2007). 
 6 Id. 
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such revenue considerations abandoned in years to come. Part IV 
details the rationales behind the second phase — the Trade Phase. It 
examines the manner through which double taxation treaties 
(Treaties) and unilateral exemptions eroded U.S. withholding taxes 
on interest from inbound debt investments — investments made by 
nonresidents in the (domestic) source jurisdiction — to promote free 
trade objectives during the Cold War era. The article argues that such 
rationales severely impaired the U.S. IITR from effectively and 
equitably levying source taxation on inbound debt investments. Part V 
discusses the 1990s Anti-Avoidance Phase, which was the knee-jerk 
reaction to the hegemony of trade and investment considerations 
during the Trade Phase. The article highlights the premises of this 
phase, and their underlying problems, through an in depth analysis of 
the earnings-stripping tax abuse and the paradigm of earnings-
stripping regimes designed to counter it. Part VI uses the USESR as a 
case-study to assess critically whether the anti-avoidance paradigm 
met any of its feasible objectives. The article contends that the 
USESR’s failure is directly derived from the tottery foundations of 
the Anti-Avoidance Phase and, as such, is reflective of a more 
profound systemic failure in the IITR. Part VII presents the epilogue 
of the analyzed historic processes and a concise prologue to how 
interest sourcing rules should develop in the future. This Part stresses 
that the article is the first part of a broader research enterprise dealing 
with formulating a concrete sourcing paradigm for financial 
transactions within multinational enterprises (MNE or MNEs, as 
appropriate). It further suggests that the article’s historical analysis 
lays out a set of underlying principles that may serve as a platform for 
future reforming of the IITR. Part VIII provides the article’s 
conclusions. 
II.  THE TAXATION OF DEBT INVESTMENT: THE ISSUE IN CONTEXT 
A.  The Law and Economics of Inbound Debt Investments 
This Part explains the basic attributes of the (current) interest 
sourcing rules and conventions in preparation for the next Parts, 
which analyze the dynamics by which they were created. Although 
much of the article’s discussion is relevant outside the corporate 
framework, since international commerce is overwhelmingly 
conducted by corporations, the article limits its analysis to them.7 It 
 
 7 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International 
Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 131 (2001). 
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nevertheless refrains from addressing the possible implications of 
corporate shareholders’ imputation tax regimes on the analysis.8 
Everyone agrees that the source jurisdiction (where the income is 
formed through the productive activity of tangible and intangible 
assets, human capital, and capital investments) has the right to levy 
corporate tax before the residence jurisdiction (where the individual 
or corporate investor resides).9 This, however, is merely a formal 
recognition in the case of interest income, since the source priority 
does not provide source jurisdictions with a tangible capability to raise 
revenues from it. 
There are two relevant types of source taxes on foreign corporate 
investments — the corporate income tax and withholding taxes. 
Corporate tax is laid on the (net) taxable income of a corporate 
entity.10 If the corporation derives income from domestic and foreign 
sources, the corporate tax is applied both as a source tax (on the 
income raised by the domestic operations) and as a residency tax (on 
income generated abroad). In the context of this article, which deals 
primarily with source taxes, the analysis refers to the corporate tax 
mainly as a source tax. In contrast, withholding taxes are laid on 
different types of payments (e.g., dividends, royalties, and interest) 
made by domestic taxpayers to foreign investors and trading partners. 
Thus, withholding taxes are laid on sources of gross income and not 
upon (net) taxable income. This division of the source taxing right, 
reflected in the principles governing treaties, relies on the structure of 
the classical corporate tax system, which enshrines a distinct tax law 
treatment of investors and corporations.11 Accordingly, setting aside 
issues of tax incidence, while the corporate income tax (when it is 
imposed as a source tax and not as a residency tax) is a tax on 
 
 8 This is partly because, with the exception of the European Union (EU), which 
for the time being is a unique political arrangement, imputation tax regimes do not 
typically grant any corporate tax relief to foreigners. 
 9 Stephen E. Shay, Jr. et al., “What’s Source Got to Do With It?” Source Rules 
and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83 (2002). The residence’s 
entitlement is always secondary in the sense that if levied, it offers some type of relief 
to taxes paid in the source jurisdiction. One can argue that this concurrence is not the 
byproduct of a normative recognition of the source regime’s entitlement to levy tax 
first but a byproduct of the practice in which source recognition can take the first tax 
bite. 
 10 The corporation’s net taxable income equals its gross income (profits) minus 
its expenses. 
 11 Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the 
International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 565 (1992). 
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business, withholding taxes are perceived as taxes on foreign investors 
(e.g., shareholders and creditors). 
The following graphic schema (Figure 1) illustrates how these 
concepts interplay. Assume, for example, there is a corporation that is 
a tax resident of Country A. It has its headquarters located in Country 
A and a foreign branch in Country B. In a given year the corporation 
earned $150 from its business activities in Country A and $100 from 
its business activities in Country B (both figures represent taxable 
income before taxes). In this example, Country B is solely a source 
jurisdiction; therefore, it lays its corporate tax (as a source tax) on the 
$100 earned by the corporation in it. Country A is both a source and a 
residence jurisdiction; therefore, it lays its corporate tax on the entire 
$250 earned by the corporation in that year. Country A’s corporate 
tax is laid, as a source tax, on the $150 earned by the corporation in its 
jurisdiction and as residence tax on the foreign sourced income earned 
by the corporation’s foreign branch in Country B. To avoid double 
taxation, Country A, the residence jurisdiction, will typically grant the 
corporation tax credits for the corporate income taxes it pays abroad 
in the source jurisdiction (Country B in our case). All corporate 
income taxes are laid on taxable income (before taxes) — so if the 
corporation had been losing money, it would not be exposed to the 
taxes. 
Withholding taxes are laid by the source country on gross income 
payments. In the above example assume that the corporation’s 
headquarters (located in Country A) took a loan from an unrelated 
lender in Country C and the foreign branch (in Country B) leased 
some intellectual property rights from it. In a given year, the 
corporation’s headquarters and foreign branch had to pay USD 20 
interest and $50 royalty payments to the unrelated party, respectively. 
In this case, Countries A and B could lay withholding taxes on those 
payments. These taxes, which are nominally imposed on the unrelated 
party from Country C, are not “real” income taxes since they would 
have to be paid even if overall the unrelated party incurs losses in a 
given year and therefore has no economic income. 
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FIGURE 1.  A TAXONOMY OF THE IITR TAXES 
 
* Withholding taxes may also be laid on dividend payments. Additionally, they will also be laid 
upon interest and royalty payments made from a foreign subsidiary to its parent. 
** The withholding taxes are levied on gross income payments and thus are imposed even 
though the unrelated party in Country C has a net income loss in the taxable year in which it is 
receiving the payments. 
Legally, source supremacy is limited solely by a sovereign’s 
undertaken treaty obligations for reciprocity and nondiscrimination 
towards the residents of the other signatory.12 However, in reality, the 
actual division of a sovereign’s right to tax most frequently adheres to 
a more refined convention. This convention differentiates between the 
source jurisdiction’s unchallenged primacy to tax active business 
income and its (de facto) weaker claim on taxing passive (investment) 
income generated from foreign capital invested in its jurisdiction.13 
The source country retains its corporate tax rate and base when 
dealing with the taxable income derived by subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations in its jurisdiction. In contrast, it only has the ability to 
impose low withholding taxes on deductible payments14 (and also on 
 
 12 See sections 871(b), 882(a), and 884, which impose a relatively high 30% 
withholding tax rate on a wide array of payments made by U.S. residents to 
nonresidents. I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a), 884. 
 13 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for 
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1996). 
 14 Ault, supra note 11, at 566, 573 (noting that this principle is most notably 
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nondeductible dividend payments).15 Source jurisdictions’ ability to 
impose withholding taxes is therefore mere lip service to the notion of 
source supremacy. For example, federal statutory law prescribes that 
every interest payment made to nonresidents that is not effectively 
connected with a trade or business in the United States is subject to a 
statutory withholding tax rate of 30%.16 However, as will be 
demonstrated later in detail, the encompassing nature of the 
exemptions to this rule makes the exceptions the de facto rule of the 
land. 
The fact that withholding taxes are mostly recognized by their 
effective erosion suggests that the source jurisdiction’s desire to levy 
taxes is typically reconciled with the broader international consensus 
that passive income should be taxed primarily in the residence 
jurisdiction.17 Startlingly, this artificial division of source taxing rights 
has by and large been left unchallenged. Perhaps because of deemed 
truisms regarding the distinctness of corporate-versus-shareholder tax 
treatments, the debate over sourcing practices has neglected using a 
combined analysis of the two taxes to determine the appropriateness 
of source tax practices.18 
The present article explores how the source tax base has been 
eroded both on the withholding tax level (Part IV) and on the 
corporate tax level (Part VI). It is important to recognize that this 
leniency in a source tax jurisdiction’s tax bite has not been tantamount 
to a stronger fiscal grasp of the residence jurisdiction. Rather, the 
dynamics described below, which led to erosion of the source tax base, 
took place as residency taxation was eroded as well. 
 
followed with respect to income derived from portfolio investments). 
 15 Richard L. Umbrecht & Don W. Llewellyn, Planning Pitfalls and 
Opportunities for Foreign Owned Corporations Under the Earnings Stripping Rules, 
47 TAX LAW. 641, 646 (1994). 
 16 I.R.C. §§ 861(a), 862(a)(1), 871(a), 881(a)(1). 
 17 This consensus has been defended on numerous grounds which include (1) 
benefit principle rationales (which some may consider to assign passive income 
primarily to the residence jurisdiction), (2) administrative convenience, and (3) the 
(intra-nation) equitable desirability of taxing passive income on the consolidated 
progressive resident basis, which best reflects the taxpayer’s ability to pay. See 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95 
TAX NOTES 1793 (June 17, 2002); Paul D. Reese, United States Tax Treaty Policy 
Toward Developing Countries: The China Example, 35 UCLA L. REV. 369, 373 
(1987). 
 18 For some of the few exceptions, see Peggy B. Musgrave, Comments in Session 
on “Foreign Reaction to U.S. Tax Reform,” 41 NAT’L TAX J. 365 (1988); John P. 
Steines, Jr., Income Tax Implications of Free Trade, 49 TAX L. REV. 675, 676 (1994). 
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In an open and competitive global economy, international 
investors are able to shift a considerable amount of their (source) tax 
burden on capital. This theme helps explain much of what is described 
in the following Parts. The tax erosion dynamic was embroiled with 
the facilitation of certain conditions that allow greater shifting to 
debtors. These conditions19 have one common denominator — they 
undermine the bargaining position of the source jurisdiction in setting 
its “tax price” for international investments. 
Relatively low source taxes laid upon proceeds of debt 
transactions make their economics lucrative every time there is a 
jurisdictional mismatch in which a lender is a tax resident of a 
jurisdiction with lower tax rates than the debtor. This is a combination 
of two factors. First, the debtor is able to deduct the interest it pays 
from its otherwise highly taxed income. Second, the lender will only 
be subject to low (or no) levels of source withholding taxes (on the 
gross interest payments) and low income taxes (on its taxable income) 
in its country of residence. From the taxpayer’s perspective, this 
finance transaction is superior to an equivalent domestic debt 
transaction (in which the lender may be exposed to high income taxes) 
and to domestic and foreign equity investments in which shareholders 
bear at least some of the corporate tax burden and are exposed to 
higher income and/or withholding tax rates. To understand the 
historical development of the legal conventions applied to interest 
from inbound debt investments, one must first understand the 
unavoidable tension that is bound to arise from this jurisdictional 
mismatch. 
The following graphic schema (Figure 2) illustrates the 
jurisdictional mismatch. Country A and Country B impose 
respectively a 0% and 50% effective tax rate (ETR) on all sources of 
corporate income. Countries A and B entered a double taxation 
treaty, which eliminates withholding taxes on interest payments. X is a 
corporation located in Country B. X took two $1000 loans each 
carrying a 10% annual interest rate from two different creditors in 
Countries A and B. In a given year X paid $200 interest payments. 
These payments are deductible, so X could use them to reduce its 
corporate income. Because of the different ETRs in Countries A and 
B, X’s creditors will have a different net gain of $100 and $50, 
respectively. Since the payments to both creditors are equally 
deductible to X, it will prefer to take loans from creditors in Country 
A, from which presumably it will be able to get better terms, than 
 
 19 See supra Part IV.D for a discussion of these conditions in detail. 
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from creditors in Country B. X’s preference to loan from Country A’s 
creditors will come at the expense of Country B’s treasury. X’s 
interest payments to the foreign creditor will reduce its taxable 
income in $100, which given Country B’s 50% ETR, would have 
resulted in a $50 tax liability. However, unlike the case of the interest 
payments made by X to its creditor in Country B, Country B’s 
treasury does not tax any of the foreign creditor’s interest proceeds. 
FIGURE 2.  JURISDICTIONAL MISMATCH 
 
* Comprised of $100 interest payments received from X + $0 corporate income tax payments. 
** Comprised of $(-200) deductible interest expenses. 
*** Comprised of $(100) interest payments received from X + $(-50) corporate income tax 
payments. 
B.  Where Do We Go Now? 
Tracing the IITR’s development highlights a number of its 
problematic features (e.g., IITR’s complexity, which leads to 
inefficiencies and high compliance and administrative costs).20 
However, as mentioned before, this article spotlights the development 
of the sourcing conventions of interest payments because they best 
illustrate the tax erosion dynamic it explores. The next three Parts 
provide the article’s main novel contribution to the construction of the 
IITR’s intellectual history.21 They identify three thematic phases: the 
 
 20 Benshalom, supra note 5. 
 21 This article addresses the IITR’s intellectual history. It is, therefore, interested 
Country A 0% ETR on corp. income 













The Jurisdictional Mismatch 
 
A jurisdictional mismatch occurs 
when three conditions are met: 
• Difference in effective 
source corporate tax rates  
• Low or negligible 
withholding tax rates 
• Payments that, like interest, 
are tax deductible. 
 
The unrelated lender from 
Country A is subject to a lower 
cost of capital than the lender in 
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Revenue Phase, the Trade Phase, and the Anti-Avoidance Phase. 
Each thematic phase represents an era in which a specific set of 
considerations has dominated policymakers’ considerations with 
regard to sourcing. Each is a benchmark in the process of source tax 
erosion that the article excavates. The crudeness of the present 
article’s research approach has two virtues. First, by formulating an 
evolutionary account of the sourcing of income from inbound debt 
investments, the article is able to provide its novel understanding of 
IITR development. Second, this approach allows the article to 
intertwine intimately the IITR’s development with material changes 
in the global political economy. Together, both of these virtues allow 
the article to extract deeper normative and practical conclusions 
regarding the future path of the IITR. 
The article’s attempt to make a rough historical division of tax 
conventions into chronological phases may unavoidably seem 
simplistic. However, trailing the historical development of legal norms 
requires periodization to trace the conventions and interests from 
which they were molded and the reality of the circumstances from 
which their contours were forged.22 This article does not argue that 
every theme was unique to a designated period in the IITR’s 
evolution.23 Each period is roughly defined, beginning at the point in 
which a specific set of considerations begin to gain dominance, up to 
the point when a new set of considerations arise. Hence, under the 
 
in how people were explaining, justifying, and theorizing the different sourcing 
arrangements established. Accordingly, it primarily refers to secondary material from 
the relevant periods that deal with those questions. 
 22 Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 315 (discussing briefly the necessity of 
periodization in historic research). 
 23 In fact, the scholarship of pioneer policymakers informs us that many of the 
different issues, tradeoffs, and considerations that we struggle with today were 
already openly recognized in earlier IITR stages. PAUL DEPERON, INTERNATIONAL 
DOUBLE TAXATION 11–12 (1945) (“The attitude of governments towards the problem 
of international double-taxation is determined by factors such as the degree and 
direction of economic development of the country concerned, the commercial and 
financial relations that the country maintains or seeks to establish with other 
countries, the amount of public revenue obtained by taxing international business and 
the technical features of the national tax system.”); Henry S. Bloch & Cyril E. 
Heilemann, International Tax Relations, 55 YALE L.J. 1158, 1159, 1166 (1946); H. 
David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An 
Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 362–64 (1981). The article cites to the 
1923 and 1925 reports made to the League of Nations, which recognized that source 
taxation of foreign investment is equivalent to a tariff on capital-importing, infringes 
with income tax standards of horizontal equity, and is inconsistent with capital-
importing countries’ desires to attract foreign investments. 
BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC 4/14/2008  12:05 PM 
644 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  27:631 
article’s conception, a period does not end when it loses its dominance 
— rather, it ends when it is fundamentally challenged. 
III.  THE REVENUE PHASE: FROM THE END OF WWI UNTIL THE END 
OF WWII 
In the first phase — the Revenue Phase — the article sets out to 
demonstrate the original concerns of the different IITR policymakers 
in the period between the two world wars. I argue that, unlike the 
periods that follow it, the dominant debate during this phase was 
about the allocation of revenues between capital-importing and 
capital-exporting nations.24 The article’s main claim in this Part is that, 
because of the urgency of reducing double taxation after WWI and 
the political turbulence in the 1930s and 1940s, the Revenue Phase 
resulted in incomplete sourcing conventions. Since then, the IITR’s 
sourcing conventions developed as an amiss set of stopgap measures, 
which did not try to reformulate the IITR’s original deficiency. This, 
as the article demonstrates in its following Parts, contributed to the 
dynamics of source tax erosion. 
To be sure, at the time, the IITR was primarily concerned with 
alleviating double taxation. As a baseline for discussion, it is 
important to recognize that Europe had a well established tradition of 
liberalized foreign trade and capital investments, which flourished in 
the pre-WWI years.25 The concern over double taxation originated 
from the International Chambers of Commerce — an umbrella 
organization of the business community, which recognized post-war 
growth potential in continental Europe, especially in new nations that 
replaced pre-war empires.26 This concern was later endorsed by the 
governments yearning for foreign investments to restore their 
economies. At the same time, coming out from the devastation of 
 
 24 P. Verloren van Themaat, Intervention, VIII CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL 
INTERNATIONAL 47, 48 (1947) (claiming that the pre-war conventions gave more heed 
to the theoretical underpinnings of allocating the right to tax while the post-WWII 
Anglo-American treaties were a byproduct of a give and take bargaining process). 
 25 Evelyn Kolm, The Emerging System of Double Taxation Agreements in the 
Late 19th and 20th Centuries, FEJLESZTES ES FINANSZIROZAS: Q. HUNGARIAN ECON. 
REV. 66, 66–67 (2005) (summarizing the social developments that led to the pre-WWI 
market integration). 
 26 DEPERON, supra note 23, at 14–16; JOHN G. HERNDON, JR., RELIEF FROM 
INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 69–120 (1932); Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at 
1066–71; Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief Through 
International Agreement 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 102–06 (1945). 
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WWI, governments had dire needs for revenue.27 In this context, the 
combination of business ambitions to go global and the (new at the 
time) income tax based public finance scheme of European countries28 
resulted in a high double taxation exposure for cross-border activities. 
Given the high tax rates imposed during and after WWI, this risk of 
double taxation introduced a serious obstacle to re-liberalizing cross-
border trade.29 This Part demonstrates, however, that even though 
trade considerations triggered policymakers’ endeavors to formulate 
an IITR, the controversies that delineated its course of development, 
especially with relation to inbound financial investments, were by and 
large related to the allocation of revenues among sovereigns. 
The two decades of the Revenue Phase were a unique period. The 
process of delineating the IITR as a new doctrine of law and public 
policy involved a lot of experimentation to create terminology as well 
as governing principles. This process was simultaneously pursued by 
nongovernmental parties (International Chambers of Commerce and 
academics),30 as well as by national legislators and bilateral treaty 
negotiators.31 
At the beginning of the Revenue Phase there were four income 
tax rules of the land. The first was the United Kingdom’s rule which 
imposed income tax liabilities on the worldwide income of all its 
residents. The second was the United States’ rule, which, to avoid the 
problem of double taxation, supplemented the residency taxation with 
credits for income taxes paid to foreign countries.32 Both the United 
 
 27 Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law, 2 INT’L LAW. 692, 700 (1967–1968). 
 28 HERNDON, supra note 26, at 261. 
 29 Id. at 7; Mitchell B. Carroll, The Development of International Tax Law: 
Franco-American Treaty on Double Taxation-Draft Convention on Allocation of 
Business Income, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 586, 587 (1935); Burton W. Kanter, The United 
States Estate Tax Treaty Program, 9 TAX L. REV. 401, 402 (1954); Rosenbloom & 
Langbein, supra note 23, at 361 (“During and shortly after World War I, double 
taxation became a matter of worldwide significance. Rates of direct taxation, 
particularly income taxation, were increasing, as was the volume of international 
business.”). 
 30 EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL 
COOPERATION (1928); Thomas S. Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of 
Double Taxation, 22 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 192, 193 (1930). 
 31 Kolm, supra note 25, at 71–74. 
 32 In 1918 Congress enacted, unilaterally, a generous statutory double taxation 
relief measure, which credited taxes paid in foreign jurisdictions by American 
residents and citizens. George F. James, The Taxation of Business Income from 
Foreign Sources, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 234–35 (1946); Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 
4, at 1041–59. In 1936, Congress laid another important tax layer to the U.S. IITR by 
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Kingdom and the United States, which at the time were the most 
dominant capital-exporting countries, refrained almost entirely from 
entering treaties during the Revenue Phase.33 The third was the rule of 
Germany and the countries that emerged from the Austro-Hungarian 
empire, which, to avoid double taxation, supplemented the residency 
taxation with treaties. These treaties often assigned different sources 
of income to either the residency or the source jurisdiction.34 Fourth 
was the French rule, which had a strong emphasis on taxation only at 
the source. 
At the outbreak of WWII, there were more than sixty treaties 
intended to relieve double taxation between different countries 
(mainly in Europe).35 In general, these treaties, especially those signed 
during the 1920s, demonstrated a strong preference toward residence 
allocation.36 This is not surprising given that most of these treaties 
were signed between declining empires (e.g., Austria and the United 
Kingdom) and their former colonies (e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, and Ireland). The old empires, likely to be capital 
exporters to their former colonies, would benefit from residency 
allocation. This allocation of tax revenues probably mirrored the 
divergence in bargaining power between the former superpower (even 
if already in decline) and its previous colony.37 Additionally, most of 
 
setting a 10%-15% statutory withholding tax rate on the gross payments of interest 
(and other payments) to nonresidents (individuals and corporations). See Revenue 
Act of 1936, 74 P.L. 740, §§ 211(a), 231(a), 49 Stat. 1648, 1714, 1717; Ault & 
Brandford, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that the 30% tax rate is a heritage of old times, 
when the tax rates on net taxable income were much higher — thus the 30% rate was 
actually considered a redress that was necessary because the withholding taxes were 
levied on gross income); Marcel Singer, Some American Discriminations Against 
Foreign Enterprises, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 776, 779 (1945–1946). 
 33 DEPERON, supra note 23, at 15; Mitchell B. Carroll, Tax Inducements to 
Foreign Trade, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 760, 761 (1945–1946). The only exceptions 
for this are the U.S.-French double taxation treaty (which was very limited in scope) 
and the U.K.-Ireland treaty (in which Ireland forfeited its right to levy source tax). 
The article considers the U.S.-Sweden double taxation treaty signed during WWII 
also as an exception. 
 34 See Kolm, supra note 25, at 71–73; Wang, supra note 26, at 102–07. This was 
possible because at the time most income taxes employed in Europe were not like the 
idea of economic income we have today, “but impôt reals, an untranslatable 
expression for a series of separate taxes imposed on different types of income on a 
source basis, such as a tax on land, a tax on business profits and the like . . . .” See 
John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1999). 
 35 DEPERON, supra note 23, at 15. 
 36 Wang, supra note 26, at 102. 
 37 The most transparent example for this is the double taxation treaty between 
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the pre-WWI European colonies shared the income tax system of 
their former rulers. This meant that questions of source were probably 
marginal and insignificant. Thus, after the empires were broken, the 
dynamic of tax administration continuity may have served as a de 
facto platform for adopting residence taxation.38 
Early on, policymakers recognized that, unless some multilateral 
coordination norms were introduced to the IITR, the dynamics of 
unsystematic legislation and treaty negotiations would produce 
different arrangements, posing an immense implicit tax of 
administrative and compliance costs on foreign trade.39 As a result, the 
most prominent role of delineating IITR conventions during the 
Revenue Phase was by and large invested in the League of Nations 
(the League) — a body in which poor net capital-importing countries 
had dominant representation. The remainder of this Part describes 
how these countries tried, unsuccessfully, to counter the inherent 
difficulty in source taxing mobile capital assets by using the 
egalitarian, multilateral framework of the League to promote a 
cartelized arrangement. The open confrontation in the League 
 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, signed in 1926, in which no taxes were levied on the 
source level. This arrangement was obviously revenue biased towards Britain, the 
main capital exporter at the time. See Wang, supra note 26, at 105–06. 
 38 Taxpayers operating in different parts of the empire were subject to a single 
centralized tax authority and tax rules. Prior to its post-WWI bifurcation, the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy had two sets of different direct tax systems (one for the more 
agrarian Hungary and one for the more industrialized Austria). In the post war era 
two things happened: many formerly subordinated vessels became independent, and 
the Hungarians accepted most of the Austrian direct tax rules. This made the 
implementation of residency much easier. See Kolm, supra note 25, at 67–68, 72–73. 
In the British-Irish scenario, it is useful to compare the Irish arrangement with its 
arrangement with other, non-European members of the Commonwealth. In those 
cases, where because of geographic distance there was no single tax administration, 
double taxation arising from U.K. residency was avoided through a regime that 
divided the revenues between the United Kingdom and the source jurisdiction. This 
alternative regime was intended to encourage U.K. residents’ foreign investment in 
the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom deducted source taxes paid up to half of its 
tax liability and the other (source jurisdiction colony) provided the rest of the relief to 
the taxpayer so that the taxpayers’ tax liability would not exceed the lower of the two 
taxes. See DEPERON, supra note 23, at 15 (noting that Britain adopted the splitting 
arrangements to encourage investments in the commonwealth); James, supra note 32, 
at 231 (describing how Britain’s capital-importing colonies (e.g., South Africa, 
Australia) exempted foreign sourced income earned by their residents altogether); 
Wang, supra note 26, at 74. 
 39 HERNDON, supra note 26, at 69–171 (providing a description of the different 
convoluted arrangements produced by national legislators and treaties during the 
1920s). 
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between debtor and creditor countries on the taxation of capital 
income is the most telling example of the importance of revenue 
consideration in this era. The prospects of such a cartelized 
arrangement may have seemed more plausible at the time than they 
do today. At the time, international investors operated in a less 
mobile, transparent, and sophisticated business environment, which 
made it difficult to shift source taxes to debtors. 
The League’s process of codification was both technically and 
politically convoluted. On the technical level, the various League 
committees had to agree on terminology that corresponded well to the 
various, trailblazer income tax systems, all of which had not yet taken 
root in a nonwar-crisis environment. The attempt to allocate resources 
between (what eventually became coined) source and residence 
jurisdictions was protean and subject to fluctuation.40 Some practical 
mechanisms of taxing and auditing businesses with cross-border 
activities were also discussed, though not resolved fully, during that 
period of time.41 
Revealing as the discussions over these technical obstacles are, 
this article focuses on the political reconciliation that took place in 
those discussions. Despite the European countries’ will to remove 
income tax barriers that sparked initially the IITR formulation’s 
endeavors, the main issues in the Revenue Phase debates did not deal 
with how to best facilitate trade. In fact, the bone of contention 
between sovereigns during the Revenue Phase related to the 
allocation of the revenue base. The sparring partners on the different 
sides of the debate42 were the non-European and continental 
European debtor countries, on the one hand, and the net capital-
 
 40 Wang, supra note 26, at 81–88. The article notes that, in the course of shaping 
the IITR’s terminology, alternative criteria were suggested to distinguish between 
different income sources for the purpose of allocating them to the country of 
residency/domicile or source/origin (e.g., income derived from tangibles versus 
intangible assets and personal versus impersonal taxes). 
 41 SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION: A STUDY IN THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BUSINESS REGULATION 27–33 (1992) (describing the 
Carrol committee’s works and findings and the 1935 draft allocation convention); 
Carroll, supra note 27, at 704 (explaining how the arm’s-length standard was 
formulated); Wang, supra note 26, at 79 (noting that the League’s 1933 draft 
convention suggested the use of formulary methods based on turnover for permanent 
establishments when the arm’s-length standard did not work adequately). 
 42 Wang, supra note 26, at 86–89 (describing how the creditor countries opposed 
suggestions made by the United Kingdom to tax investment income only in investors’ 
country of domicile). 
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exporting countries (mainly the United Kingdom and, to a lesser 
degree, the United States) on the other.43 
At the forefront of the debate was the right to tax the income 
proceeds of capital investments — namely, interest and dividends.44 
This proved a major issue because of the enormous debts European 
countries, primarily France, Italy, and Russia, incurred during the 
War.45 Settling the right to tax the interest proceeds of debts was 
therefore tantamount to determining to what extent the debtor 
countries were to bear these unheard of amounts of sovereign debts 
by themselves. In allocating the primary sourcing right over capital 
resources, the United Kingdom, the biggest capital-exporting country 
at the time, argued vehemently in favor of an exclusively residence-
based taxation of such passive income sources.46 In other words, the 
British believed that income taxes should only be imposed as direct 
taxes by the country of residence. The firm opposition posed by the 
United Kingdom was the source of much of the controversy during 
the Revenue Phase.47 
Over the course of the 1920s, the League’s position on this issue 
proved volatile and subject to changes.48 In 1923, a nominated 
committee of four professors submitted a report to the League, 
recommending the right to levy taxes on all intangible wealth 
(including debt investments but excluding mortgages) to be granted 
exclusively to the investor-creditors’ domicile. This was by and large 
refuted in a report submitted by a group of Technical Experts to the 
Financial Committee of the League in 1925.49 Net capital-exporting 
countries responded to the debtor countries’ 1925 success with much 
more active participation in the League. Most apparently, the United 
 
 43 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at 1072 (claiming that the battle lines were 
drawn as a result of the resolutions made by the 1923 Rome congress, which assigned 
the right to tax interest and dividends to both source and residence jurisdictions). 
 44 Id. at 1077. 
 45 T.B. Macaulay, The Allied Debt to the United States, WASH. STAR, Aug. 27, 
1922, at 4–5. 
 46 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at 1086–87. 
 47 For more details, see Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at 1069–73, 1084–86 
(describing the role of the prominent United Kingdom in the International Chamber 
of Commerce 1921–1923 and in the League). 
 48 Wang, supra note 26, at 81–96. 
 49 HERNDON, supra note 26, at 58–62 The book notes that the 1925 report, which 
allocated the right to tax impersonal taxes to source jurisdictions and direct-personal 
taxes to the domicile jurisdiction, was expected to shift revenues from creditors to 
debtors countries — this motivated the United States, as a net capital-exporting 
country, to join the League’s fiscal committee discussion. 
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States, which was not a League member, joined actively in the 
League’s fiscal committee discussions. This resulted in a backlash 
against source allocation. Article 3 of the draft bilateral convention 
published by the League in 1927 allowed the source jurisdiction to 
take the first tax bite on most passive income payments but required it 
to refund those taxes once evidence showed that taxes were levied in 
the residence jurisdiction.50 This strengthening of residency revenue 
allocation triggered a harsh retaliation from debtor countries. As a 
result of this struggle, the issue of interest revenues’ allocation was not 
resolved.51 In 1928, three draft conventions, each of them providing 
different allocation rules for interest income, were published. These 
arrangements were: (1) taxation solely at source (convention I-a) or 
residence (I-b) and (2) a hybrid of source taxation with a residual 
residence tax (I-c).52 In a sense, the League’s decision to publish the 
three model conventions reflected a general withdrawal from the 
strong pro-residency stance in treaties signed during the early 1920s.53 
The draft convention of 1943, which sealed the Revenue Phase, 
was a sharp contrast to the League’s ambivalent stance during the 
1920s. The League’s fiscal committee met in Mexico. There, without 
representatives from war battered Europe, Latin American countries 
dictated a pro-source agenda. In the context of interest, the pro-
source agenda produced article IX, which granted source jurisdictions 
the exclusive right to tax income from movable capital.54 This 
convention best illustrates the centrality of revenue considerations 
during that period — showing that source countries were not willing 
to forfeit these considerations for the sake of attracting foreign 
investments and engendering cross-border trade. It further 
demonstrates the overall function of the League during the Revenue 
Phase in strengthening the notion of source taxation. Nevertheless, 
the limited impact the Mexico convention eventually had is also 
reflective on capital-importing countries’ failure to entrench 
sufficiently the notion of source taxation so that it would stand the test 
of time. 
 
50 Wang, supra note 26, at 89. 
 51 DEPERON, supra note 23, at 26 (noting that this was one of the few issues on 
which the League did not take a clear stand). 
 52 HERNDON, supra note 26, at 185–90, 238–41; Carroll, supra note 27, at 699. 
 53 DEPERON, supra note 23, at 17 (noting that although most pre-war treaties 
assigned the right to tax financial income to the residence jurisdiction, they did not 
preclude the possibility of a withholding tax laid on the source level); Carroll, supra 
note 29, at 587. 
 54 Carroll, supra note 27, at 708–10. 
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To flesh out the difference between the Revenue Phase and later 
periods, it is useful to think about the changing discourse in favor of 
the right to tax at the source. In Revenue Phase discourse, this right 
was framed as a right to receive revenues from capital investments in 
source jurisdictions. In sharp contrast, today source jurisdiction 
supremacy is typically framed as the right of the source jurisdiction to 
offer foreign investors a genuine reduction in source taxes. 
Developing source countries argue that these reductions often do not 
meet their goals of attracting foreign investments because they are 
(arguably) absorbed by residence taxes laid on investors. While the 
Revenue Phase’s discourse was about source countries’ right for 
revenues, prevalent current discourse is about their right not to collect 
taxes to induce foreign investments. Although these two positions are 
not analytically mutually exclusive,55 the practical gap dividing them 
illustrates the difference between contemporary and Revenue Phase 
sourcing conventions. 
The formal victory of debtor countries, embodied in the Mexican 
convention towards the end of the Revenue Phase, turned out to be 
more marginal than one could have originally expected.56 The 
Revenue Phase ended at the end of WWII and the beginning of the 
Cold War. It had tremendous impact with regard to IITR’s 
terminology and on some of its principles, which still echo in 
contemporary IITR treaties’ discourse. Many of these arrangements, 
still present today, may be understood as a byproduct of the debtor-
versus-creditor country controversy.57 
The Revenue Phase’s actual allocation conventions, overall 
inclined to support a stronger source entitlement to tax, were severely 
undermined by the conventions that followed during the subsequent 
Trade Phase. These trade oriented sourcing conventions were initially 
developed by capital-exporting countries (e.g., the United States and 
the United Kingdom). They were later endorsed by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (the OECD), which, 
during the Trade Phase years, was comprised almost solely of Western 
European and North American countries. 
 
 55 In theory, source jurisdictions could levy taxes and use them to subsidize 
(presumably undersupplied) foreign investments. 
 56 Bloch & Heilemann, supra note 23, at 1166–67. 
 57 Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 366 (noting that the sourcing 
model of assigning income based on classification of the sources in which it derived 
was adopted during the Revenue Phase to enable a compromise between creditor and 
debtor countries). 
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IV.  THE TRADE PHASE: POST-WWII TO 1990S 
The Trade Phase is the period of time that roughly overlapped 
with the Cold War. While the terminology of the IITR was engraved 
during the Revenue Phase, its dominant allocation conventions took 
form during this post-WWII era. The article argues that the Trade 
Phase paradigm, which advocated the removal of tax obstacles from 
the flow of international investment, was unbalanced and resulted in 
severe revenue losses and inequities. 
The star of the “British position” during the Revenue Phase, 
which asserted that interest proceeds should be taxed only in the 
creditor country, was yet to rise. As it turned out, the substantive 
allocation norms of the IITR were influenced more heavily by events 
that took place after WWII than by those of the Revenue Phase. The 
political turbulence in the first half of the 20th century and the radical 
shifts in geopolitical power, which preceded and followed WWII, 
limited the substantive impact of the Revenue Phase’s allocation 
conventions. This limited impact is perhaps best exemplified by the 
way international, tax base incomes from inbound debt investments 
were de facto allocated during the post-WWII decades. Most 
interestingly, while skewing the sourcing of withholding taxes on 
capital income is by no means revenue neutral, the discourse that 
eventually led to this erosion focused on trade and investment 
considerations, allotting less heed to revenue or distributive (let alone 
redistributive) considerations. 
A.  The Rationales of the “Trade Argument” 
The main normative argument of the article is that investment 
and trade considerations of the Trade Phase have undermined unduly 
the fiscal base of the IITR and its ability to elicit a set of governing 
equity standards. To fully understand this claim about trade 
considerations’ inappropriate impact, one must first understand the 
historical context in which these considerations gained dominance and 
their underlying rationales. 
International trade and investment regimes and the IITR shared a 
parallel development, with only few (tangential) policy oriented 
attempts to resolve this gulf58 (although recently there have been more 
 
 58 An exception to this is the World Trade Organization (WTO) discussions and 
rulings with regard to the U.S. income tax export subsidies. See Yariv Brauner, 
International Trade and Tax Agreements May Be Coordinated, but Not Reconciled, 25 
VA. TAX REV. 251, 295–97 (2005) (exploring a number of WTO cases in which U.S. 
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academic attempts to address this issue).59 An obvious connection 
could nevertheless be drawn between these regimes’ underlying goals. 
Both regimes facilitate international cooperation through sets of 
reciprocal restraints that nations undertake, which limit the ability of 
government actions to disturb transnational commercial activity.60 
While the IITR generally restricted its role to the elimination of 
double income and capital gain taxation impediments, the 
international trade and investment regime sought to liberalize trade 
and investment through the reciprocal and gradual reduction (and 
eventually even elimination) of tariffs, import quotas, and export 
subsidies. The pillars of the international trade regime are the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), initially agreed to in 1947. 
These agreements eventually laid the institutional framework of what 
is known today as the World Trade Organization. The GATT were a 
unique set of agreements, since countries undertaking GATT 
obligations also undertook the obligation to abide by future GATT 
rules in future negotiations. Besides enforcement mechanisms, the 
GATT agreements impose three types of reciprocal commitments on 
their members — tariff limitation, a certain “code of (proper) 
conduct,” and, most importantly, nondiscrimination.61 
This Part draws a conceptual connection between the two regimes 
with reference to the post-WWII period ending with the beginning of 
the 1990s. The intuitive connection between withholding taxes on the 
gross income proceeds of foreign investment, essentially tariffs on 
 
income tax export subsidies were found to be inconsistent with U.S. obligations); 
Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between 
Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 79, 89–95 (1998) (describing the Uruguay talks around these issues in 1993). 
 59 Brauner, supra note 58; Catherine Brown & Christine Manolakas, Trade in 
Technology Within the Free Trade Zone: The Impact of the WTO Agreement, NAFTA, 
and Tax Treaties on the NAFTA Signatories, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 71 (2000); 
Green, supra note 58, at 88–89 (comparing the substantive obligations of countries 
under GATT to bind their tariffs and those frequently undertaken under double 
taxation treaties); Paul R. McDaniel, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Trade 
Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions, 57 TAX L. 
REV. 275 (2004); David B. Oliver, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Tax Treaties and 
the Market-State, 56 TAX L. REV. 587 (2003); Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
(How) Should Trade Agreements Deal With Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV. 533 
(2002); Warren, supra note 7, at 147–49; Whitney Whisenhunt, To Zedillo or not to 
Zedillo: Why the World Needs an ITO, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 541 (2002). 
 60 John S. Brown, Formulary Taxation and NAFTA, 49 TAX L. REV. 759, 799–
800 (1994). 
 61 KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM 48–49 (2003). 
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foreign lenders and investors, was openly recognized by scholars at 
the beginning of the Trade Phase.62 The article argues that there is an 
ever growing “trade considerations” spillover into the IITR 
policymaking. The most obvious landslide victory for trade 
considerations during this period is undoubtedly the colossal 
reduction of source laid withholding taxes on the gross income 
proceeds of inbound capital investments. Nevertheless, one should 
refrain from equating the IITR’s role as a promoter of free trade 
solely with the reduction of source based withholding taxes. A more 
profound trade implication of the IITR’s treaties, which typically 
receives less attention than withholding taxes, is their ability to reduce 
the tax-related uncertainties of foreign investors. Both are discussed 
in more detail below. 
As mentioned previously, the Trade Phase is signaled not by the 
fact that trade considerations were accounted for, but for the manner 
in which trade considerations marginalized more traditional revenue 
and equity considerations. While some critics have argued against 
actual reduction in tax barriers on trade63 and against the plausibility64 
 
 
 62 Bloch & Heilemann, supra note 23, at 1159, 1166, 1173 (arguing that while the 
effects of taxes on trade are marginal, they can have a significant influence on the 
profit margin and the investment environment, and observing that debtor nations’ 
preference for source taxation is counterproductive since “a country in need of capital 
may be willing to forego taxing the return on that capital . . . [and] willing to enter an 
exemption type treaty” and concluding by saying that “[if] free flow of trade [is a 
matter] of international concern . . . then fiscal policies, too, must be a matter for 
international investigation”); Roy Blough, Treaties to Eliminate International Double 
Taxation and Fiscal Evasion, 5 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 208, 208–09 (1947) 
(“Aside from the question of equity is the economic aspect of international double-
taxation. World prosperity is promoted by enlarged world trade and capital 
movements, free from the restrictions which the operation, often the unintended 
operation, of tax laws may impose. International double taxation discourages the 
growth of world economy. The discouragement arises, not only from the taxes 
themselves, but also from uncertainty as to when they will be imposed.”); James, 
supra note 32, at 231. 
 63 Herrick K. Lidstone, Double Taxation of Foreign Income? Or an Adventure in 
International Double Talk, 44 VA. L REV. 921, 925–26 (1959) (arguing that the 
mechanisms for relieving double taxation removed trade obstacles only to big 
American multinational enterprises (MNE or MNEs, as appropriate) that lobbied 
Congress to obtain generous benefits). 
 64 Brauner, supra note 58, at 283 (advocating that trade and taxation rationales 
are in many senses antithetical, and the most visible example for that is the 
differentiation in withholding tax-rates under double taxation treaties, which violates 
the “most favorable nation” principle advocated by the WTO). 
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and the (analytical65 and normative)66 desirability of this fusion of 
international trade and tax, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the question of why trade considerations triumphed so dramatically 
over alternative considerations. 
The answer has several layers. First, trade consideration 
dominated in the first two to three decades of the IITR’s post-WWII 
development because Western capital-exporting countries (namely, 
the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom) desired 
to re-establish international trade practices following the havoc 
wreaked by WWII. It is relatively straightforward to point out that 
this liberalization was necessary to promote U.S. economic interests 
(and specifically U.S. business sector interests) by creating demand for 
U.S. capital and production surpluses.67 Nevertheless, the 
liberalization objectives also supported a broader notion concerning 
world public order in the post-WWII era. Following the grief caused 
by the devastation of WWII, it has been observed that: 
Unless statesmen are able to solve the perplexing problems of 
international double taxation, serious economic and political 
results may follow. An emerging world system designed to 
achieve peace through political integration cannot withstand 
the economic balkanization to which double taxation will 
contribute.68 
Simply put, in a world at the verge of an escalation into the Cold War 
period, free trade was both a carrot and an ideological “common-
carrier” of anti-communist Western policy. Just like the Marshall 
Plan, free trade was a vehicle for rebuilding Europe and acquiring 
allies (e.g., Japan and Germany). It was a way to make sure that 
American investors and MNEs would take an active part in a 
European/Japanese resurrection. Emerging as the dominant winner of 
WWII, with unmatched industrial capabilities and capital resources, 
the United States aimed to lead a new capitalistic world order. It is 
 
 65 H. David Rosenbloom, What’s Trade Got To Do With It?, 49 TAX L. REV. 593, 
597–98 (1994) (arguing that the attempt to equate tariffs and withholding taxes just 
because both pose barriers on trade and investments is analytically wrong, since there 
are many attributes that differentiate between these two mechanisms of social policy). 
 66 Richard M. Bird, A View From the North, 49 TAX L. REV. 745, 748 (1994) 
(“[T]he trade policy dog should [not] necessarily wag the tax policy tail.”). 
 67 ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & F.E. KOCH, INCOME TAX TREATIES: THE INCOME 
TAX CONVENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA AND 
OTHER COUNTRIES 5 (1949); James, supra note 32, at 229. 
 68 Wang, supra note 26, at 73. 
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easy, therefore, to see why the United States revered trade 
considerations as a major component of its foreign (tax) policy. 
Second, in the perspective of many countries at the beginning of 
the Trade Phase, there was no clear distinction between trade and 
revenue considerations. Capital-exporting countries, which taxed 
worldwide income of corporate and individuals residents (most 
notably, the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United 
Kingdom), could have expected a net increase in their revenues as a 
result of reciprocal reductions in withholding taxes on capital income 
on the source country level.69 One should bear in mind that, when 
trade considerations took form, the international tax planning 
industry and offshore tax havens were not firmly established.70 
From the perspective of many net capital-importing countries, the 
need to prioritize trade over revenue considerations may be explained 
by their acute need for foreign investment to re-establish post-war 
economies,71 compounded by the U.S. monopoly over capital 
resources at the end of WWII. Additionally, one may assume, the 
remission of the withholding tax base was made easier because it was 
never a solid source of revenue for many capital-importing countries. 
Erosion of the withholding tax base was thus erosion of a marginal 
source of tax revenues. These reductions in withholding taxes in the 
early stages of the Trade Phase could be perceived as the beginnings 
of a vicious tax-competitive practice cycle among source jurisdictions 
for the taxation of nonresidents’ passive income. 
The analysis becomes much more complicated in the later stages 
of the Trade Phase (during the late 1970s–1990s), when the sharp 
distinction between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries 
gets somewhat blurred. Hence, in the U.S. case, reducing investment 
barriers for U.S. investors is still the objective of reciprocal reductions 
on withholding taxes. However, this treaty policy also eases the tax 
burden over the inflow of capital investments, particularly bond 
investments, into the United States. This inflow plays a crucial role in 
light of the U.S. mounting trade and fiscal deficits.72 In this context, 
 
 69 Robert J. Patrick, Jr., United States Negotiating Objectives and Model Treaties, 
in 1977 TAX TREATIES AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY 12–13 (Virginia di Francesco & 
Nicolas Liakas eds., 1977). 
 70 This was not a coincidence. Both these phenomena gradually matured in 
response to the tax-arbitrage possibilities that residents from capital-exporting 
countries have in an IITR characterized by low source taxes in some jurisdictions. 
 71 Wang, supra note 26, at 115. 
 72 Diane Renfroe et al., Earnings Stripping: An Analysis of the Proposed 
Regulations Under Section 163(j), 91 TNI 43-46 (Oct. 23, 1991). 
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the article examines the intriguing metamorphosis of U.S. IITR 
policies during the Trade Phase as a case study. The United States 
started the Trade Phase as the only major capital-exporting country. 
As a result, while all other capital-importing countries surrendered 
fiscal needs to compete for U.S. investments, the United States sought 
reciprocal withholding tax reductions to ease its residents’ foreign 
investment experiences, while adhering to the notion of capital-export 
neutrality to retrieve some of its fiscal losses in its resident revenue 
base. This capital-export neutrality emphasis changed over the course 
of the Trade Phase as the United States became a debtor nation. To 
successfully attract for foreign investments, the U.S. ideal of capital 
export neutrality had to shuffle off its mortal coil with regards to 
inbound debt investments. This was necessary for the United States to 
compete, like any other country, for foreign capital. 
The article demonstrates the applicability of the above analysis to 
the source income tax treatment of inbound debt investments. While 
the present article’s analysis focuses mainly on U.S. treaty law, it also 
addresses other important representative examples. As mentioned, 
the baseline for the discussion, established during the Revenue Phase, 
is the 30% withholding tax rate imposed by federal statutory law on 
interest payment made to nonresidents.73 This Part discusses how the 
effect of withholding source taxes on interest is eroded through three 
major exemptions: (1) the reduction/exemption of interest payments 
made by treaties, (2) the bank deposit exemption, and (3) the 
portfolio interest exemption.74 
B.  U.S. Treaty Law 
With few exceptions,75 scholars generally agree that treaties are 
one of the core income tax policy stimulants of transnational 
investments and, as such, an avenue for economic development.76 
 
 73 See supra note 16. 
 74 MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED 
STATES 2-47, 2-54 (2002). 
 75 See, e.g., Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 644 (2005) (arguing that 
treaties have a limited impact on reducing trade barriers to developing countries). 
 76 PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS: A MANUAL ON THE OECD 
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL A-5–A-7 (2001) (noting that 
both the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) model treaties recognize the attempts to reduce double 
taxation as motivated by trade and development objectives); Jeffrey M. Colon, 
Financial Products and Source Basis Taxation: U.S. International Tax Policy at the 
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Leaving aside treaties’ compliance cost reductions77 and signaling 
benefits,78 treaties induce transnational trade between signatory 
sovereigns mainly through a mutual relaxation of (source and 
residence) tax rules.79 
Thus, with the exception of information sharing initiatives 
directed to counter tax evasion, treaties are a more useful policy tool 
to limit taxation than to solve problems of untaxed (or under-taxed) 
income.80 This relaxation of tax rules has two prongs. The country of 
residence must modify income taxes to grant its taxpayers’ (at least 
partial) relief for taxes paid in the source jurisdiction. In return, 
source jurisdictions must reduce withholding taxes on investments and 
leases and avoid imposing discriminatory income tax rules on active 
income generating activities that are controlled by foreign residents.81 
From a perspective that seeks to liberalize international 
investments, withholding taxes have an undisputable negative effect. 
 
Crossroads, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 786 (1999); William P. Streng, U.S. Tax Treaties: 
Trends, Issues, & Policies in 2006 and Beyond, 59 SMU L. REV. 853, 856–58 (2006). 
 77 JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 197 (2000) (noting that an 
additional trade enhancing aspect of treaties is reducing the compliance uncertainties 
faced by foreign investors); Blough, supra note 62, at 208; Paul D. Reese, United 
States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries: The China Example, 35 
UCLA L. REV. 369, 375 (1987) (noting that, especially with regards to permanent 
establishments, the compliance burdens of dealing with a foreign tax system may 
make the entire investment unattractive). 
 78 David H. Rosenbloom, Current Developments in Regard To Tax Treaties, 40 
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 31, 31–52 (1982); Miranda Stewart, Global 
Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and 
Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 148 (2003) (“Bilateral tax treaties seem 
to serve largely to ‘signal that a country is willing to adopt the international norms’ 
regarding trade and investment, and hence, that the country is a safe place to 
invest . . . . The signing of a tax treaty is often presented as an important symbol of 
international capitalist engagement.”). 
 79 DEPERON, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the contribution of treaties to the 
“development of international trade” as “render[ing] more acceptable to national 
treasuries the sacrifices involved in the elimination of double-taxation”); Richard L. 
Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71, 
71 (1995). 
 80 Michael S. Lebovitz & Theodore P. Seto, The Fundamental Problem of 
International Taxation, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 532 (2001). 
 81 U.N. Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries 8 (2001) [hereinafter 
U.N. Treaty]; Green, supra note 58, at 113–14; Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in 
a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (1995) 
(providing a good summary of the way treaties reduce source tax rates); David R. 
Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 459 (1996). 
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As is most evident in the case of capital-intensive sectors, withholding 
taxes are imposed on gross income82 and therefore do not correspond 
to similar (possibly progressive) income taxes imposed on domestic 
investors, which take into account their (net) ability to pay. In the 
financial industry, laying high withholding tax rates over interest may 
have severe effects due to high volumes of interest payments and 
relatively small margins of profit.83 The article shows that the tendency 
of treaties to impose lower tax rates on interest payments than on 
returns to equity facilitated a (de facto) acknowledgment that source 
country entitlement on income derived from debt investments is 
weaker than from equity investments. 
Treaties are also constructed to help countries protect residents’ 
foreign investment interests from falling prey to the fiscal needs of 
host countries.84 Although it is now widely believed that the discipline 
of the international financial markets and the dynamic of tax 
competition effectively counter some of these tendencies, that is not 
necessarily how the issue was perceived at the end of WWII. As 
mentioned, at the beginning of the Revenue Phase, nonresidents were 
susceptible to abusive tax treatment by countries eager for revenue. In 
light of this, and in light of foreign investors’ inability to move many 
types of investments in response to changes in tax policy created by a 
political process over which they held no control, treaties had a 
prominent role in easing investor concerns over foreign investments. 
Thus, countries’ obligations to limit withholding taxes and, even more 
imperatively, to adhere to nondiscrimination norms, played a pivotal 
role in alleviating tax-related uncertainties associated with foreign 
investing during the first years of the Trade Phase.85 This is especially 
true with respect to the ability to deduct payments made to foreign 
parties, as discussed in greater detail in the next Part.86 
 
 82 STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES: WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 16–17 
(Kluwer Law International 1998). 
 83 Ault, supra note 11, at 570. 
 84 F.E. KOCH, THE DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 4–5 (Stevens & Sons 
Limited 1947). 
 85 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAX 
ADVISORY GROUP DRAFT NO. 21 REPORTER’S STUDY 141 (1992). 
 86 Slemrod & Avi-Yonah, supra note 59, at 546 (“With certain exceptions, [the 
anti-discrimination provision in treaties usually requires that] payments of interest, 
royalties and other disbursements to foreign residents, for the purposes of 
determining taxable income, are to be deductible under the same conditions as 
payments to domestic residents.”). 
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This Part describes the manner by which the United States, 
through its treaty network, has facilitated a significant (reciprocal) 
reduction in the withholding tax rates with all of its major trading 
partners.87 The reduction has fatally eroded the fiscal viability of 
withholding taxes (especially on interest payments) as a source of 
revenue. Devoid of any substantive fiscal content, statutory 
withholding taxes mainly operate today as a measure to induce double 
taxation treaty negotiations with the United States.88 
The article identifies and analyzes two constitutive moments in 
the history of U.S. treaty policy: the completion of the U.S.-U.K. tax 
convention in 1945 and the promulgation of the U.S. Model Treaty in 
1976. 
1.  The U.S.-U.K. Double Taxation Treaty, 1945 
The importance of the U.S.-U.K. double taxation treaty (the 
Treaty) results from the fact that it was signed by the two dominant 
Western capitalist powers who won the war immediately after WWII, 
as the Western and Eastern blocks of the Cold War era were 
beginning to form. Given the dominant position of the United States 
and the United Kingdom in the post-WWII global economy, the 
conventions the Treaty introduced during the course of the Trade 
Phase have become the unchallenged core of the IITR. 
With regard to the tax treatment of transnational capital income, 
and specifically to the taxation of interest payments, the Treaty 
introduced the following prominent notions. First, it separated tax 
treatment of dividends and interest payments. As mentioned 
previously, this separation has been vindicated on the grounds of a 
“real difference” doctrine, which detached interest earnings from the 
debtor’s jurisdiction because, unlike dividends, they were not 
considered to be derived from the source.89 
Second, the Treaty exempted interest payments from any 
withholding source taxes.90 In this respect, the Treaty endorsed the 
 
 87 MCINTYRE, supra note 74, at 2-37–2-38. 
 88 Id. at 2-47; Jones, supra note 34, at 3 (“The more outrageous the provisions of 
internal law, the better the starting position for negotiating treaties.”); Roin, supra 
note 81, at 1765 (noting that reducing withholding taxes on passive income may result 
in a revenue gain because of more taxes resulting from more foreign investments). 
 89 EHRENZWEIG & KOCH, supra note 67, at 44–45. 
 90 Income Tax Treaty, art. VII, Apr. 16, 1945, U.S.-U.K., 4 Tax Treaties (CCH) 
¶ 10,962 (expired) [hereinafter The Treaty]. 
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long standing “British position” of the Revenue Phase,91 which, as 
noted in the previous Part, assigned the right to impose direct 
personal taxes solely to the domicile/residence jurisdiction.92 
The Treaty went beyond the elimination of double taxation and 
left a longstanding, eminent mark on international tax legislation and 
policy of both the United States and the United Kingdom.93 
Furthermore, although rarely recognized as such, the completion of 
the Treaty comprised the major and most fundamental building block 
of the IITR during the Trade Phase. It laid the foundation for the 
IITR’s distinction between the source tax treatment of active and 
passive income and the treatment of dividends and interest payments. 
This had a prominent effect on the income tax allocation of proceeds 
from transnational investments. Particularly with debt investments, 
the Treaty’s determination that passive income should be taxed only 
by the residence jurisdiction had a major impact on revenue 
allocation. This was the League’s original determination from 1923, 
which capital-importing countries tried so fiercely to overturn during 
the course of the Revenue Phase. Given the exceptionally strong 
position of both (capital-exporting) economies at the time (the United 
States commanding the lion’s share of capital resources and the 
United Kingdom standing in a leading financial and trading position), 
the Treaty’s terms and concepts were internalized into customary 
practices of double taxation treaties. The article points out that the 
Treaty predated the League’s final London convention from 1946. It 
was therefore the first to articulate and adopt many of the IITR’s 
sourcing conventions.94 These conventions were by and large 
 
 91 PICCIOTTO, supra note 41, at 5 (noting that the residence principle was 
adopted in the United Kingdom in 1909 as part of an effort to legitimize the income 
tax). 
 92 KOCH, supra note 84, at 10. 
 93 PICCIOTTO, supra note 41, at 45 (suggesting that following the adoption of the 
Treaty, the United Kingdom adopt a foreign tax credit relief legislation); HERMON M. 
WELLS, UNITED STATES POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME 
170–71 (1950) (noting that prior to the Treaty, the United States refrained from 
substantially reducing its 30% withholding tax rates through treaties); Carroll, supra 
note 33, at 772. 
 94 The Treaty was the first to adopt the notion of source primacy (discussed on 
page 7), which is supplemented by residence jurisdiction obligation, to relieve double 
taxation. This comes in contrast to most of the pre-WWII treaties, which typically 
assigned the right to tax a specific source of income either to the source or to the 
residence jurisdiction. See P. Verloren van Themaat, The Anglo-American Group of 
Tax Conventions, Concluded Since 1939, Compared with Pre-War Treaties, III 
CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 1, 6 (1947). 
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incorporated into the League’s London Convention95 and later picked 
up by the OECD Model Treaty discussed below. Furthermore, both 
the United States and, even more so the United Kingdom,96 entered 
into a series of treaties with Western European countries shortly after 
signing the Treaty. The series of treaties, all based on the Treaty,97 
comprise the pillars of the post-WWII treaties network. Hence, the 
Revenue Phase’s sourcing conventions were not emphasized, partially 
because the United States and the United Kingdom did not endorse 
them by refraining from entering treaties. By the same token, the 
Treaty’s Trade Phase sourcing conventions were absorbed so 
profoundly into the IITR because these two Goliaths used the Treaty 
as a model for their following treaties. Accordingly, the Treaty is the 
(self-crowned) codification of the piecemeal legacy created by the 
League. 
A careful analysis of the balance struck by the Treaty with regards 
to source tax treatment of interest payments reveals two important 
insights about the premises of the Trade Phase it initiated. First, the 
United States accepted exemption of interest from withholding taxes 
despite net revenue loss.98 This merits clarification, since the United 
 
 95 Like the Treaty, the 1946 London convention prioritizes the residence 
jurisdiction. Its allocation arrangements greatly resemble those of the Treaty. For 
example, the articles in the 1946 London convention — IV (business enterprises), V 
(shipping income), VII (compensation for services), VIII and IX (the income from 
movable capital: dividends and interest payments), and X(2) (royalties from 
intangibles) — have allocation arrangements that correspond better with the Treaty 
arrangements (III, V, XI(3), VI and VII, VIII), than with Mexico’s 1943 convention 
source allocation arrangements. See London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions: 
Commentary and Text, League of Nations Doc. C.88.M.88 1946 II.A. (1946); Carroll, 
supra note 27, at 709–20 (making a comparison between the OECD Model Treaty 
and the Mexico and London draft conventions and concluding that the OECD model 
incorporated most of the London convention’s arrangements, which with respect to 
interest, followed the Treaty’s arrangement). 
 96 Jones, supra note 34, at 1–3 (noting that out of the 100 in force, 
comprehensive treaties the United Kingdom had entered into by 1999, the first fifty 
were entered into between the years of 1945–1951, the Treaty being the first of those 
agreements). 
 97 John G. Archiballd, U.K.-U.S.A. Double Taxation Convention, VIII CAHIERS 
DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 1, 18–25 (1947) (discussing the eminent effect of the 
Treaty on the treaties the United Kingdom entered into in subsequent years with 
certain Commonwealth members); Mitchell B. Carroll, Double Taxation Convention 
of The United States since 1939, V CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 25, 26 
(1947); Mitchell B. Carroll, Evolution of U.S. Treaties to Avoid Double Taxation of 
Income, Part II, 3 INT’L LAW. 129, 139–40 (1968–1969) [hereinafter Carroll, 
Evolution]. 
 98 EHRENZWEIG & KOCH, supra note 67, at 139. 
BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC 4/14/2008  12:05 PM 
2008] The Quest to Tax Interest Income in a Global Economy 663 
States was by no means in an inferior bargaining position. There are a 
number of tactical99 and cynical100 explanations for the United States’ 
acceptance of the interest withholding exemption rule. The article, 
however, points out that this endorsement represents an 
acknowledgment by U.S. tax policymakers that source tax exemptions 
on investment income are justified, despite revenue loss consequences 
of the Treaty, because of their positive effect on the free flow of 
capital. U.S. policymakers were able to look beyond the net bilateral 
revenue impact of the Treaty to promote an arrangement that, in the 
long run, would advance U.S. objectives.101 Soon after its completion, 
the United States entered into a series of treaties with Western 
European countries that followed the same interest allocation 
arrangement. In all of these cases, countries desiring access to New 
York money markets waived most rights to levy source withholding 
taxes on gross interest payments made to Americans,102 leading to U.S. 
revenue gains. 
Second, the Treaty’s unofficial “codification” of the policy behind 
double taxation treaties engraved the writing on the wall with regard 
to the IITR’s future development during the Trade Phase. That the 
IITR was founded on a contractual agreement between the two 
richest nations demonstrates that rather than promoting a vox 
populorum vox Dei (the voice of peoples is the voice of God/the law), 
the reign of capital intensive countries triumphed. Additionally, it 
demonstrates that it was pro-investment, rather than fiscal or source 
tax equity considerations, that laid down the law in the IITR. In this 
respect, the profoundness of the Treaty transcends the manner in 
 
 99 Id. (noting that this compromise was easy to swallow from an American 
perspective, since 75% of British investors’ holdings in the United States were in the 
form of equity rather than debt). 
 100 U.S. treaty negotiators could assume reasonably that due to its high level of 
accumulated capital resources at the end of WWII, the long-term net fiscal effects of 
the exemption were likely to even out and perhaps even reverse after a short while. 
 101 Clarence Castimore, Income Tax Treaties with France, Sweden and Canada 
and the Convention with Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 4 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON 
FED. TAX’N 537, 547 (1946) (asserting that the Treaty, and the treaties that followed 
it, had a pronounced objective of alleviating double taxation to foster foreign trade 
and investments that would result in more revenues). 
 102 Carroll, Evolution, supra note 97, at 139; Charles R. Irish, International 
Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
292, 294–95 (1974) (describing how the United States used its favorable bargaining 
position at the end of WWII to induce Western European countries to deemphasize 
their source tax rights upon entering into treaties with it). 
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which its actual mechanisms and principles echo in current treaty 
practices. 
2.  The Promulgation of the U.S. Model Treaty, 1976 
The U.S. Model Treaty can be understood as the second in a 
sequence of three model tax treaties: the OECD, the U.S., and the 
United Nations (U.N.) Model Treaties. The underlying theme behind 
the first in that series, the OECD Model Treaty published initially in 
1963, was to provide potential double taxation treaty signatories with 
a contractual and interpretational anchor through which they could 
reduce the transactional costs of reaching an agreement.103 In the 
context of withholding taxes, the OECD provided a number of focal 
tax rates. These tax rates represented a “reasonable” equilibrium, 
from which it was implicitly understood that signatories would not 
deviate substantially. 
The OECD Model Treaty followed the London convention, 
which, as mentioned, was inspired by the Treaty. It refuted the 
conclusions of the Model Bilateral Convention agreed upon by the 
League in Mexico in 1943. It accepted the Treaty’s distinction 
between passive and active income and, similarly to the Treaty, 
assigned a stronger claim in the former to the country of residency. It 
was, therefore, anything but ideologically neutral. The 
institutionalization of the OECD Model Treaty and its ancillary 
commentary as the official cornerstone of the IITR motivated other 
bodies to codify model tax treaties. Most notably, the U.N. Model 
Treaty published initially in 1980 tried to offer an alternative to the 
OECD tax hegemony by stressing the need for a fair return on foreign 
investments in developing countries through fortifying and 
broadening the applicability of the source principle.104 However, as 
demonstrated below, with regard to the withholding tax treatment of 
interest payments arising from inbound investments, the U.N.’s 
 
 103 OECD, Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, June 30, 1963. 
 104 U.N. Treaty, supra note 81, at vii, xi–xii (noting that the reasonableness of 
reciprocal measures should be questioned when there is great disparity between the 
initial negotiating positions of parties to treaties); Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra 
note 23, at 393; Donald R. Whittaker, An Examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. 
Model Tax Treaties: History Provisions and Application to U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 39, 46 (1982) (attempting to solidify the U.N.’s 
arguments in favor of source allocation); Irish, supra note 102, at 298–314 (providing 
an illuminating analysis regarding the dynamics that lead countries to waive their 
source taxing rights). 
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professed ambition of creating a viable practical (or even conceptual) 
alternative to the OECD model was met only on the margins.105 This 
failure, in my opinion, is a direct result of the U.N. Model Treaty’s 
attempt to attain redistributive objectives without first articulating a 
coherent set of development goals that international taxation should 
aspire to promote.106 
In 1976 the United States published its first model treaty, which, 
as a matter of intentional design, followed the structure and wording 
of the OECD model.107 The ambition to create a model treaty can be 
explained as: (1) part of a longstanding U.S. trade policy to avoid 
favoritism,108 (2) an expression of its disagreement with aspects of 
various other model tax treaties (e.g., on the proper withholding tax 
rate on interest and worldwide taxation of citizens), and (3) a way to 
introduce its opinions on issues insufficiently addressed by the OECD 
Model Treaty (e.g., treaty-shopping).109 
A comparison of section 11 of all three treaties, which deals with 
the imposition of withholding taxes on interest, reveals that, besides 
the recommended rate each treaty prescribes, there is little difference 
in much of their wording and structure.110 While the OECD Model 
Treaty prescribes a 10% withholding tax rate on interest payments, 
the U.S. Model Treaty prescribes an interest exemption regime for 
taxes at the source level. This is one of the few material differences 
between the U.S. Model Treaty and the OECD benchmark.111 The 
 
 105 Willem F.G. Wijnen, Towards a New UN Model?, 52 BULL. INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 135, 143 (1998) (raising the question of whether it makes sense to 
maintain a separate U.N. Model Treaty project when only eight of its provisions were 
actually embraced by a significant number of treaties). 
 106 U.N. Treaty, supra note 81, at xx–xxiii (2001) (failing to articulate the 
distributive role international taxation should play in promoting and/or 
conceptualizing international justice). 
 107 Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 398 (“The most important 
decision that has been made in designing the U.S. model was to adhere as closely as 
possible to the OECD model. . . . [which] offers the best chance of achieving the 
maximum degree of international tax harmonization, [and] the reduction of tax-based 
barriers to the free movement of goods . . . .”). 
 108 Reese, supra note 77, at 392 (drawing a connecting policy rationale between 
the U.S. Model Treaty and its trade-treaty policies — suggesting that in both cases the 
United States seeks to reach a uniform treaty agreement with a broad range of 
nations rather than entering into particular and diversified agreements with each 
nation). 
 109 Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 396. 
 110 KEES VAN RAAD, MODEL INCOME TAX TREATIES 38–42 (1990). 
 111 Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 399. 
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OECD Model Treaty’s recommended rate is relatively low, in 
comparison to current prevalent statutory rates.112 It illustrates the 
vigor of the notion that the main objective of the IITR during the 
Trade Phase period was to remove tax obstacles to foreign debt 
investments among developed countries. Such a low level of 
withholding taxes on gross payments may still prove substantial in 
highly leveraged sectors (e.g., the financial sector and, to a lesser 
extent, the manufacturing sector) where gross interest flows are large. 
One must remember that, unlike equity investment, the proceeds of 
debt investment avoid the source (corporate) income tax completely. 
The leniency in interest taxation is particularly evident with regards to 
the United States, since its model treaty’s interest source exemption 
does not provide even minimal support to the notion of source 
country precedence.113 
The U.N. Model Treaty takes a somewhat awkward position and 
does not recommend a specific withholding tax rate on interest (or on 
dividend and royalty payments). This seems antithetical to its stated 
ambition — to strengthen developing nations’ interests as source 
countries. The U.N. group of experts recently reaffirmed this original 
commitment “even in light of the global economy’s pressures.”114 Due 
to gaps in bargaining power among developed (capital-exporting) and 
developing (capital-importing) countries, one wonders why U.N. 
Model Treaty drafters believed that leaving rate determinations to 
parties’ negotiation would skew more revenue to the source 
jurisdictions. Even in recent commentary, the U.N. failed to provide a 
detailed account of what an equitable income tax source return for 
inbound debt investment is.115 As previously mentioned,116 high 
withholding taxes may have substantial negative externalities on the 
inflow of debt investment. Given that the incidences of withholding 
 
 112 A few examples of OECD members: France has a 16% withholding tax that 
may go up to 60% when the location of the creditor is not disclosed. C.G.I. art. 125-A-
III, 990A-C. Germany and the United Kingdom impose a 20% withholding tax on 
interest. EStG § 50 (7); Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 349 (2). 
 113 The OECD and U.S. Model treaties both exempt royalty payments from 
withholding taxes. VAN RAAD, supra note 110, at 42–47. They both impose a 5%/15% 
withholding tax rate on dividend payments to related/unrelated parties. Id. at 36–38. 
 114 U.N. Treaty, supra note 81, at xi–xii. 
 115 Id. at 168. The commentary claims that there are good reasons for reducing 
the withholding tax costs on debt financing since the identity of the parties that bear 
the tax is not clear. Combined with withholding taxes’ negative externalities on 
investment inflow, the unclear incidence of the tax may indeed make it unworthy to 
maintain for a developing country. 
 116 See supra Part IV.A. 
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taxes’ burden may frequently be shifted to the debtors, it could well 
be the case that higher than 10% withholding tax rates are not worth 
maintaining. The problem with the U.N.’s position is its failure to 
offer developing countries a robust analysis that provides the 
analytical tools to determine the optimal withholding tax rate on 
interest for their jurisdiction. Thus, in its decision to leave the 
determination of actual rates to the parties, the U.N. Model Treaty 
failed to provide developing countries with adequate guidance.117 
The manner by which all the abovementioned model treaties, 
specifically the U.S. Model Treaty, tax lightly (or fail to tax) inbound 
debt investments, is the best example of the manner in which trade 
considerations erode the source tax base. The national need to attract 
debt capital led nations to lower withholding tax rates on interest. The 
thoroughgoing reduction is particularly troublesome because it makes 
international debt investments appear much more lucrative from a tax 
perspective. Since interest payments are deductible in the source 
country, the exemption of interest payments from source taxes 
opened a significant loophole for tax planners. As discussed below, 
the fiscal losses and inequities of this loophole are particularly 
problematic in the case of debt investments made by related parties, 
which offer an easy and costless substitution for equity investments. 
C.  The Bank Deposit and Foreign Portfolio Income Statutory 
Exemptions 
Reciprocal treaty-based reductions in withholding tax rates do not 
solely account for the erosion of the source income tax base regarding 
interest payments from inbound investments. There are two 
exemptions to U.S. sourced income that were “unilaterally” 
incorporated by the United States into the Internal Revenue Code 
(Code): the banking deposit and the foreign portfolio income 
withholding tax exemptions. These unilateral tax reductions have 
three common characteristics: (1) both appeal to interests of powerful 
commercial lobbies, (2) both involve capital-elastic and, therefore, 
tax-sensitive118 resources, which, in the absence of multinational 
 
 117 In practice, the major representative developing economies (e.g., China, India, 
Indonesia, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Russia) maintain a mode 
double taxation treaty withholding tax rate on interest of about 10% or slightly lower, 
with some rare exceptions (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt) that maintain a mode 
rate between 10% and 15%. See Tax Analysts, Worldwide Tax Treaties Database, 
http://services.taxanalysts .com /taxbase/nav.nsf/WWTTFrame?Open&login. 
 118 Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 
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coordination among sovereigns, are the most natural candidates for 
fierce tax competition, and (3) neither require that residence taxes be 
laid on the source exempted income. 
First, the bank deposit exemption: From its original enactment in 
1936119 to the present,120 in order “not unduly to hamper foreign 
investments . . . of money and services [in the United States],” 
withholding taxes excluded interest payments arising from foreigners’ 
bank deposits not effectively connected to a U.S. business’ income.121 
Through the years, such an exemption became prevalent among 
practically all developed countries.122 
Second, the foreign portfolio income exemption: As part of the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, a wide withholding taxes exemption 
applied to interest income arising from inbound portfolio investments, 
including bonds issued by the U.S. government, U.S. corporations, 
and financial institutions.123 This exemption was part of an attempt to 
facilitate better access by the U.S. public and private sectors to the 
Eurobond market by reducing the burden on U.S. debtors via 
decreased interest rates.124 The exemption also helped U.S. debtors 
 
TAX L. REV. 537, 547–54 (2003) (providing the key distinctions between direct and 
portfolio investments, and arguing that the latter are more volatile, short-term, and 
responsive to bottom line returns and to financial markets). 
 119 See supra note 32. 
 120 I.R.C. § 871(i). 
 121 EHRENZWEIG & KOCH, supra note 67, ¶ 19. 
 122 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis 
of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1581 tbl.1 (2000) (demonstrating that 
with few exceptions all developing countries were exempting interest arising from 
bank deposits in the 1990s). 
 123 I.R.C. § 881(c). The portfolio income exemption had one major exception: 
section 881(c)(3)(A) excludes interest payments made to foreign banks from the 
exemption. I.R.C. § 881(c)(3)(A); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1580 n.5 
(arguing that this exclusion was made to protect the competitiveness of U.S. banks); 
Bruce A. Elvin, The Recharacterization of Cross-Border Interest Rate Swaps: Tax 
Consequences and Beyond, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 631, 643–44 (1995) (suggesting that swap 
transactions open a wide array of options for bypassing the exclusion of interest paid 
to foreign banks from the portfolio income exemptions). 
 124 DORON HERMAN, TAXING PORTFOLIO INCOME IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS — A POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 38 
(2002) (suggesting that the comparative advantage of Eurobond lenders over their 
domestic competitors is their ability to reduce tax liabilities and regulatory costs); 
Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1580 (describing how the exemption resulted from a 
fortuitous combination of (1) the U.S. deficit following the 1981 Reagan 
administration tax reform, and (2) the shutdown of the Netherlands Antilles finance 
subsidiaries tax planning avenues); James P. Holden, Jr., Repeal of the Withholding 
BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC 4/14/2008  12:05 PM 
2008] The Quest to Tax Interest Income in a Global Economy 669 
meet the anonymity and net-return obligations of those markets.125 Put 
differently, the high demand for portfolio bond investment supplied 
by the Eurobond markets allowed bond issuers operating in them to 
shift the withholding tax burden to the debtors. The tax exemption 
should therefore be understood as the U.S. government’s response to 
domestic business (and deficit reduction) pressures by accepting the 
“net interest rate standard” of the Eurobond markets to better 
compete for these capital resources. 
However, enactment of the portfolio income (source) tax 
exemption regime resulted in a myriad of unwanted avoidance and 
evasion complexities, both associated with a need to identify the true 
fiscal residency of the bond holder.126 Furthermore, the U.S.’s 
unilateral exemption led to a tax-competitive chain reaction by which 
all major economies abolished withholding taxes on interest arising 
from inbound portfolio investments to avoid migration of capital 
resources to the United States.127 
The withholding tax exemption granted to interest income 
originating from inbound portfolio investments is perhaps the best 
example of source tax harmonization that is enforced by a tax-
competitive dynamic. To date, the exemption of portfolio income has 
diminished the revenue generation of the U.S. withholding tax on 
interest so profoundly that serious doubts have arisen as to whether 
maintaining the withholding tax on foreign investments is a 
worthwhile endeavor.128 
In examining the foreign portfolio income exemption, it is 
important to recognize the pivotal role that double taxation treaty 
principles played in paving the way. As one commentator put it: “[The 
 
Tax on Portfolio Debt Interest Paid to Foreigners: Tax and Fiscal Policies in the 
Context of Eurobond Financing, 5 VA. TAX REV. 375, 393 (1985) (“First, but not 
necessarily foremost, Congress wanted U.S. business and the U.S. Treasury to have 
efficient access to foreign capital. Second, Congress wanted to assure such access 
without creating any significant tax compliance problems.”). 
 125 Holden, supra note 124, at 383. 
 126 Marilyn D. Franson, The Repeal of the Thirty Percent Withholding Tax on 
Portfolio Interest Paid to Foreign Investors, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 930 (1984) 
(discussing the problems of limiting the exemption only to portfolio interest and to 
nonresidents); Holden, supra note 124, at 415 (claiming that Congress enacted the 
exemption without fully accepting the avoidance costs that broad access to the 
Eurobond market would entail). 
 127 Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1581; Franson, supra note 126, at 976 
(describing how France and West Germany repealed their withholding taxes on 
interest to compete successfully with the United States). 
 128 Colon, supra note 76, at 843–44. 
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portfolio income exemption] legislation supports the longstanding 
principle of international taxation that portfolio investors should be 
subject to taxation on interest income [only] in their own country of 
residence or nationality.”129 
D.  The Trade Phase: Some Final Observations 
One has to recognize that international trade and IITR 
considerations coincided during the Trade Phase to promote 
liberalization of international markets and international commerce. 
This fusion resulted in a conceptual spillover of international trade 
considerations into the realm of IITR — one that was not balanced by 
coherent source tax equity standards. As IITR revenues comprised a 
relatively small fraction of developed countries’ tax mix during the 
Trade Phase, the trade liberalization considerations had tremendous 
impact on the development of the IITR during that crucial era. 
This spillover would have been less disturbing to some countries if 
reductions in withholding taxes on interest were compensated for by 
higher taxation on the residence frontier (in which it is assumed that 
the worldwide income of residents is taxed).130 However, revenue 
reciprocity seems to be impaired beyond rescue131 in light of the 
current flourish of loosely taxed and regulated financial offshore 
centers along with the development of sophisticated deferral, 
inversion, and tax avoidance techniques by tax planners. These 
phenomena are related to taxpayer ability to shift and manipulate 
holdings of mobile financial (and intangible) assets to foreign 
jurisdictions. The accelerating mobility of assets during the last fifty 
years is an inevitable byproduct of a number of overall positive 
developments, including the overall pro-capitalist political stability in 
Western countries, technological and telecommunication 
 
 129 Franson, supra note 126, at 972. 
 130 Julie A. Roin, Adding Insult to Injury: The “Enhancement” of § 163(j) and the 
Tax Treatment of Foreign Investors in the United States, 49 TAX L. REV. 269, 283–84 
(1994) (noting that the United States refrained from entering tax treaties with 
jurisdictions that will not adequately tax the proceeds of passive income on a 
residence basis). 
 131 Perhaps most indicative of the reciprocity notion’s conceptual deficiency is the 
growing readiness of policymakers to favorably consider the shift to a territorial 
system. HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
INCOME (2001) (concluding that exempting repatriated income would greatly simplify 
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and may even yield more revenues than the 
current regime); see also FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON 
FEDERAL TAX REFORM 103–04, 133–35 (2005). 
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advancements, and the expansion of international financial markets 
and intermediaries, which allowed taxpayers to locate intangible 
assets in one jurisdiction while controlling them from another. 
Accordingly, tax-motivated inversion techniques involve changes in 
citizenship or residency status by wealthy individuals or corporations 
from high-tax rate jurisdictions to those with lower effective rates.132 
Deferral techniques involve sheltering income in foreign subsidiaries 
thus avoiding taxation until realization based repatriation.133 Tax 
evasion arises from taxpayer ability to invest financial holdings in 
source jurisdictions that impose null or negligible tax rates, without 
reporting earnings to residence jurisdictions.134 Avoidance techniques 
typically involve related party dealings to shift income to low-tax 
jurisdictions, the use of hybrid entities to repatriate excessive foreign 
tax credits,135 and/or the manipulation of financial and intangible asset 
holdings in an effort to create artificial losses in high-tax 
jurisdictions.136 While solutions have been conceptually established, 
and partially employed, to redress problems of evasion (through 
information sharing), inversion (through re-characterization rules), 
and deferral (through anti-deferral CFC legislation),137 the problem of 
avoidance remains an open wound within the IITR. 
Reduction of withholding taxes is not unique to the United States; 
to the contrary, it is probably more significant in the European Union 
(EU).138 The United States, however, is an interesting example 
 
 132 Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing 
the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409, 415 
(2002). 
 133 See generally Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Reform of the Foreign 
Tax Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391 (2003). 
 134 See HERMAN, supra note 124, at 275–77, 428; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 
118, at 578–82. 
 135 See Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals 
May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 
59 SMU L. REV. 751, 759–63 (2006) (showing how MNEs use hybrid entities for 
importing tax-credits). 
 136 See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Understanding Long Term Capital, 106 TAX 
NOTES 681 (Feb. 7, 2005) (providing an elaborate example of such manipulation). 
 137 But see Yesim Yilmaz, Tax Havens, Tax Competition, and Economic 
Performance, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 587, 590 (Aug. 14, 2006) (challenging the 
effectiveness of this anti-deferral regime and claiming that holding hybrid entities in 
tax havens are used by U.S. MNEs to reduce the tax liabilities of their foreign 
subsidiaries while avoiding exposure to subpart F liabilities). 
 138 To promote the four freedoms of people, goods, services, and capital mobility, 
the EU enacted directives that disallow the imposition of withholding taxes between 
related parties in Member States. See, e.g., Council Directive 03/49, Common System 
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because it illustrates the different techniques through which (stable) 
trade conventions were pursued under changing circumstances. 
Looking at U.S. IITR policy during the Trade Phase, one could break 
down reductions of source withholding taxes on inbound debt 
investments as a gradual shift from the notion of neutrality to the 
notion of competition.139 At the beginning of the Trade Phase, the 
United States acted in the capacity of a creditor country. Thus, as 
mentioned, it promoted a capital-export neutrality policy, which 
assumed that proceeds from financial investments are taxed by 
residence jurisdictions. The capital-export neutrality was thus good, 
not only for liberalizing international trade and investment markets, 
but for the Treasury as well. At the end of the Trade Phase, the 
United States, in its capacity as a debtor and later as a net-debtor,140 
unilaterally reduced its withholding taxes to attract investment. In 
sharp contrast with notions of capital-export neutrality, the 
competitive process of converting foreign investors from a source of 
revenue to a source of credit did not require reciprocal tax reductions 
on behalf of other tax regimes. Paradoxically, as the United States 
shifted from being “the” net capital-exporting country to a major net-
capital-importing country, it was motivated by the same 
considerations that led net capital-importing countries at the 
beginning of the Trade Phase to swim along the withholding tax 
erosion current, despite subsequent fiscal loss. 
The shift in the United States’ position flags an important 
distinction between the beginning and the end of the Trade Phase: the 
role of tax-competition. In a sense, the initial decision of net capital-
importing countries to comply with the Treaty’s norms, which dictated 
erosion of withholding taxes, was a form of tax-competition intended 
 
of Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made Between Associated 
Companies of Different Member States, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 49 (EC); Council Directive 
90/435, Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies 
and Subsidiaries of Different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6 (EEC). 
 139 Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 324–34 (arguing that U.S. international tax policy 
should be divided into four periods and identifying two post-WWII periods; the first 
lasting until the beginning of the 1980s, which emphasized capital export neutrality, 
and the second lasting from the beginning of the 1980s until the late 1990s, which was 
dominated by competition considerations). 
 140 During the second half of the 1970s, the United States maintained a net-debt 
exporting balance (around USD 16 billion). It became a net-debtor in 1984 (USD 32 
billion). Its position as a net-debtor increased dramatically in 1985 (USD 151 billion) 
and 1989 (USD 281 billion). To date, the United States is a net-debtor of USD 1,993 
billion. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Investment Position of the 
United States at Yearend, 1976-2005 (2005), http://bea.gov/bea/di/intinv05_t2.xls. 
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to attract foreign direct investments (FDI). FDIs are typically 
strategic, long-term investments by corporations in a line of business 
in a certain country.141 Thus, from a capital-importing country’s 
perspective, attracting FDIs by signing a double taxation treaty with a 
capital-exporting country was a cautious way to maximize investment 
in its jurisdiction without completely eroding its withholding tax base. 
Although the volume and magnitude of FDIs are increasing 
significantly and constantly as the global economy continues to 
integrate, this growth has been overshadowed by the meteoric growth 
of portfolio investment in modern global financial markets.142 
Portfolio investments are made by individuals and corporations 
seeking a diversified portfolio of financial assets and a high (net) 
return on their investments — not control of a specific entity. These 
investments are volatile, mobile, and dispersed among various types of 
investors originating from different countries.143 All of the above 
attributes make portfolio investments more sensitive to tax than FDIs. 
Accordingly, as portfolio investors and markets grew in size and 
sophistication, portfolio investors were able to utilize capital mobility 
to shift the withholding tax burden to their debtors. To tax-compete 
successfully for these investments, the United States had to make a 
strong commitment to broad foreign portfolio income exemptions. 
This change in strategy is a direct result of material changes in 
international investment markets. Nevertheless, thematically, both 
strategies ascribe to Trade Phase rationales. 
At the beginning of the Trade Phase one commentator wrote: 
[A]ny special provisions for the promotion of trade . . . would 
entail some loss of revenue in certain cases and, in certain 
other cases, it might permit [sic] manipulation. . . . [However, 
s]ave in cases of abuse, if this country wants foreign trade, it 
should be prepared to pay some reasonable premium to get 
it.144 
This commentator was correct. He failed to foresee, however, that 
in the absence of an IITR source equity paradigm, there was no 
indication as to what “reasonable premium” meant in terms of 
 
 141 See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 118, at 549–52 (discussing the ambiguous 
empirical evidence for portfolio investments’ tax sensitivity). 
 142 See id. at 542–45 (detailing the growth of U.S taxpayers’ outbound portfolio 
investments since the beginning of the 1990s). 
 143 Id. at 549. 
 144 James, supra note 32, at 246. 
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revenues. On a conceptual level, the absence of such a paradigm 
disabled tax policymakers from discerning when trade considerations 
infringed key normative tax considerations. The subsequent Anti-
Avoidance Phase represents a convoluted and, to a large extent, 
unsuccessful attempt to identify those principles. 
V.  THE EARNINGS-STRIPPING LOOPHOLE AND THE ANTI-
AVOIDANCE PHASE: LATE 1980S TO 2000S 
The third era this article defines, the Anti-Avoidance Phase, 
marks an attempt by IITR policymakers to balance considerations 
emphasized during the Trade Phase by developing mechanisms to re-
characterize the tax consequences of tax abusive transactions. The 
article argues that this attempt failed because it was conceptually 
inapt to deal with sourcing difficulties that arise from an integrated 
global market reality. During the Anti-Avoidance Phase, evasion 
opportunities associated with the growth of the international portfolio 
investment markets and the availability of loosely taxed and regulated 
financial centers145 also emerged as a major avenue of revenue loss. 
The main difference between the avoidance and evasion topics is that, 
in the case of tax evasion, policymakers conceptually resolved the 
proper methods for dealing with it (e.g., information sharing)146 — 
therefore making it a problem of incomplete implementation.147 This 
 
 145 See generally Yilmaz, supra note 137. 
 146 MITCHELL B. CARROLL, PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION 
AND FISCAL EVASION: TWO DECADES OF PROGRESS UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
37 (1939) (exemplifying that the solution was already known in the 1930s). 
 147 The OECD took measures to establish these methods by threatening to 
implement a set of multilateral sanctions against tax-havens (through bank and 
corporate secrecy laws, noninformation sharing policies, etc.) that jeopardized its 
Members’ residency taxation. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998); OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX 
PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT (2001); OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-
OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS (2000); see also 
DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, THE GREAT AMERICAN TAX DODGE 51–
117 (2000) (giving a detailed account of how American taxpayers use offshore 
facilities to evade taxation and how the use of the internet made it difficult for the 
Internal Revenue Service (Service) to prevent this abuse); Abadan Jasmon & Junaid 
M. Shaikh, Underreporting Income: Should Financial Institutions Disclose Customers’ 
Income to Tax Authorities?, 15 J. INT’L TAX’N 36, 40–42 (2004) (suggesting options for 
effective enforcement); David E. Spencer, OECD Project on Tax Havens and 
Harmful Tax Practices: An Update (Part 2), 13 J. INT’L TAX’N 32, 41–45 (2002); 
Suzanne Walsh, Note, Taxation of Cross-Border Interest Flows: The Promises and 
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Part focuses on the topic of tax avoidance because countering the 
problems associated with it requires first a more profound 
conceptualization of the issues at stake. 
In the previous Part, the article presented how the Trade Phase 
assumption (that lower source taxation would result in more residence 
taxation) failed because the economics of investment markets enabled 
the tax planning industry to develop deferral and avoidance 
techniques. By the same token, the article argues that the assumption 
underlying the Anti-Avoidance Phase, which contemplates that 
abusive tax-motivated transactions could be separated from ordinary 
business transactions, is nullified by high volumes of affiliated 
transactions within MNEs. The following Part makes this point by 
examining the manner in which the USESR failed to adequately 
source affiliated-party inbound debt investments. 
In the 1990s, on the verge of entering the post-Cold War period, 
which was characterized by a lack of any serious anti-capitalist 
political competition, fiscal regimes in the developed world faced the 
following two issues: (1) free trade cross-border practices (including 
liberalization of monetary and financial policies and omission of 
protectionist barriers to investment) had, as a matter of course, 
become so prevalent that they could almost be taken for granted and 
(2) the increasing integration and accessibility of international 
markets entailed considerable tax avoidance costs. Tax avoidance 
opportunities were most frequently associated with MNEs. Given the 
slowdown in the growth of post-WWII economies and the growing 
role of MNEs in the global economy,148 policymakers feared that the 
tax avoidance costs of promoting free trade would eventually 
jeopardize the core expenditure programs of liberal democracies’ 
welfare states.149 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was a focus on the 
attainment of Trade Phase political objectives, thus increasing 
concerns regarding the solidity of public finance schemes as an 
indispensable component of a stable (capitalist) world order.150 Such 
 
Failures of the European Union Approach, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2005); 
Douglas J. Workman, Comment, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of 
Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 686–706 
(1982) (demonstrating that incomplete implementation is not a new phenomenon). 
 148 Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of 
Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK J. INT’L L. 1261, 1269–71 (2001). 
 149 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1632–39. 
 150 See Emilio Cencerrado, Controlled Foreign Company and Thin Capitalization 
Rules Are Not Applicable in Spain to Entities Resident in the European Union, 13 EC 
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changes in the global political economy dimmed the then 
unchallenged brightness of the notion that trade considerations were 
supreme. The notion that trade considerations should be limited in 
certain cases is a mark of the Anti-Avoidance Phase paradigm. It thus 
prioritizes the need to counter tax avoidance options open to 
taxpayers with international operations, mainly MNEs. 
Fiscal avoidance is possible whenever legal form is inconsistent 
with economic substance. In the course of looking for ways to retrieve 
the integrity of their fiscal regimes, IITR policymakers recognized 
that the inherent complexities of financial transactions, as well as the 
possibility of using numerous different contractual avenues to attain 
similar results, make it very difficult to create and implement precise 
rules. However, tax authorities’ efforts to delineate broad anti-
avoidance rules have often been successfully challenged, politically 
and legally, by taxpayers on the basis that the rules are arbitrary. 
There are many mechanisms that are consistent with the anti-
avoidance paradigm’s premise. Unlike the previous, broader 
discussions of the Trade and Revenue Phases, the Anti-Avoidance 
Phase requires a narrower discussion focused on an examination of 
only one representative example. Accordingly, after briefly explaining 
the difficulties of sourcing debt investments and their susceptibility to 
avoidance schemes, the article’s next Part focuses on what it considers 
to be the best representative example: MNEs’ ability to shift income 
by related party lending — a phenomenon known as “earnings-
stripping.” More specifically, the article focuses on the USESR as a 
case study that demonstrates the problems of the Anti-Avoidance 
Phase. Dealing with the attempt to prevent abusive intra-group 
finance transactions within MNEs, the USESR example epitomizes 
the difficulties associated with the anti-avoidance paradigm’s 
premises. 
A.  The Difficulty of Sourcing Interest and the Earnings-Stripping 
Practice 
The international tax terrain, which entails the difficulty of 
formulating robust interest allocation rules, can be understood as 
consisting of two different components: (1) the different tax rates and 
sourcing techniques that apply to debt and equity instruments and (2) 
the tax-competitive global environment in which tax policymakers 
operate. 
 
TAX REV. 102, 107–08 (2004) (making a somewhat similar argument). 
BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC 4/14/2008  12:05 PM 
2008] The Quest to Tax Interest Income in a Global Economy 677 
First, the proceeds from equity investments are typically subject 
to two layers of taxation (corporate and shareholder). In contrast, 
proceeds from debt investments are subject to one tax only — on the 
creditor level (due to the deductibility of interest expenses on the 
corporate level). In addition, the bilateral treaty network has 
facilitated a (de facto) acknowledgment that source countries should 
enjoy a much stronger claim on income derived from equity than from 
debt investments.151 The combination of these two factors reveals the 
prima facie appeal of related-debt financing due to potential 
jurisdictional mismatches between the locations where interest 
deductions and proceeds are recognized. By leveraging operations in 
high-tax jurisdictions and borrowing from low-taxed lenders, 
taxpayers may take advantage of interest expense deductibility and 
negligible withholding tax on interest to reduce finance costs. This 
possibility is especially lucrative for MNEs, which can engage in 
related-debt transactions to finance subsidiaries in high-tax 
jurisdictions while retaining corporate control. This practice is called 
earnings-stripping. 
This loophole is central to this Part’s analysis and therefore an 
example with a graphic schema (Figure 3) may help to better illustrate 
it. Country A and Country B impose respectively a 0% and 50% ETR 
on all sources of corporate income. Country A and Country B then 
enter a double taxation treaty, which eliminates withholding taxes on 
interest payments. X and Y are two subsidiaries of a single MNE that 
are located in Country A and Country B, respectively. In a given year, 
Y earned $100 from its business activities in Country B, which would 
be subject to a 50% tax rate leading to a tax liability of $50. The MNE 
has a clear incentive to reduce its overall tax expenses. This could 
easily be done by financing Y’s activities with X’s debt instruments. 
For instance, subsidiary X loans subsidiary Y $1000 carrying the 
appropriate market rate of 10% annual interest. Y deducts the $100 
interest payments from its income and X, which is tax indifferent 
because of Country A’s low ETR, will report them as income. This 
way Y’s income for that year would be $0 and the MNE would avoid 
$50 of source tax costs that would have been laid on Y by Country B. 
 
 151 Axel Cordewener, Company Taxation, Cross-Border Financing and Thin 
Capitalization in the EU Internal Market: Some Comments on Lankhorst-Hohorst 
GmbH, 43 EUR. TAX’N 102, 113 (2003); see also Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 
15, at 646 (noting that under some treaties the withholding tax on dividends and 
corporate distributions is usually not eliminated but only reduced to 5%-15%, while 
passive interest income is usually exempt). 
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FIGURE 3.  THE EARNINGS-STRIPPING TECHNIQUE 
 
Second, sovereigns, conflicted between attracting foreign 
investments and protecting revenue streams, try to reduce the 
effective tax burden on capital without piercing their tax nets too 
severely. In this context, the fact that the Anti-Avoidance Phase took 
place after all major developed countries reduced effective tax rates to 
create more competitive economies reveals an interesting insight.152 
Anti-avoidance measures could be encapsulated as supplementary 
mechanisms intended to keep the tax rate reductions of the mid-1980s 
to1990s (that were accompanied by tax base broadening) within the 
original intended framework of revenue neutrality. Through their 
crude and somewhat arbitrary nature, anti-avoidance measures were 
intended to cap losses from revenue. Using anti-avoidance 
mechanisms, tax authorities aspired to balance revenue losses arising 
from deliberate tax reductions, including withholding taxes on capital 
income, with the political necessity of adhering to the unsound 
foundations of transfer-pricing and treaty based sourcing regimes. 
 
 152 Jacques Sasseville, Current Issues in International Tax Policy, in TAX 
TREATIES: LINKAGES BETWEEN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DYNAMIC NON-
MEMBER ECONOMIES 9 (Richard Vann ed., 1997) (arguing that in the 1980s and 1990s 
Western countries changed their strategies for attracting investments; instead of 
offering tax breaks they tried to make their tax systems more neutral and competitive 
through tax rate reductions and tax base broadenings). 
Country A: 0% ETR on corporate 
income 
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Treaty sourcing mechanisms were explained at great length in the 
previous Part. The next Part will critically describe some key aspects 
of the transfer-pricing sourcing regime. 
B.  The Inadequacy of Sourcing Mechanisms in Protecting the Tax 
Base’s Integrity from Earnings-Stripping Practices 
It is crucial to first understand what earnings-stripping practice is 
and why ordinary sourcing conventions provide unsatisfactory results 
when dealing with it. 
At their core, the problems associated with interest sourcing and 
earnings-stripping are a byproduct of the following two notions. The 
first notion is that MNEs should have the freedom to arrange their 
capital structure. A derivative of this is that related party debt is a 
completely legitimate finance option in pursuing various business 
objectives.153 The reluctance of MNEs to disclose sensitive information 
to creditors or to tie capital to specific locations are only two of an 
array of legitimate business reasons for MNEs to engage in related-
debt (rather than equity) financing for any related entity, regardless of 
its creditworthiness. The second notion stresses the idea that, from an 
economic perspective, a debt transaction between entities under 
common control “is ultimately just a piece of paper”154 — very 
different from debt obligations issued to unrelated parties.155 The core 
of the anti-avoidance problem in the earnings-stripping case is about 
how to reconcile the two notions. The underlying theme of the Anti-
Avoidance Phase is that tax authorities could attain the institutional 
competence to separate related finance transactions with legitimate 
tax consequences from those with illegitimate ones. 
Unsurprisingly, many of the ordinary sourcing rules developed 
during the Trade Phase have limited capacity to protect the integrity 
of the interest tax base in light of the abovementioned pressures. As a 
prologue to its detailed discussion of the U.S. earnings-stripping 
regime as a case study, this article briefly examines the sourcing 
difficulties arising from two mechanisms that directly relate to source 
interest tax base erosion: (1) the arm’s-length standard and (2) 
limitation-of-benefits clauses (in treaties) and anti-conduit legislation. 
 
 153 T. James Brooks, Why It Would Be Premature to Tighten U.S. Earnings 
Stripping Rules, 33 TAX NOTES INT’L 1017, 1023 (Mar. 15, 2004). 
 154 H. David Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections, 
Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 17 (2004). 
 155 Id. (“The hallmark of debt is an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain 
on demand or at a fixed maturity in the reasonably foreseeable future . . . .”). 
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First, the arm’s-length standard is the key sourcing technique 
through which tax authorities source related party transactions. 
Generally, the arm’s-length standard is a transaction-based approach 
employing a hypothetical inquiry156 as to how unrelated parties would 
price a certain transaction, requiring each corporate entity within a 
MNE group to report accordingly.157 However, the arm’s-length 
standard, as it is currently enshrined in a plethora of transfer-pricing 
regulations, is a mechanism that is conceptually flawed,158 practically 
inept,159 and extremely inefficient and burdensome160 for sourcing 
many complex affiliated transactions. 
 
 156 Id. at 27 (arguing that hypothetical tests are needed for any operational 
income tax system because contractual fictions allow many situations in which 
transactions cannot be accepted at face value). 
 157 Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of 
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 46–47 (1993); Joann M. Weiner, 
U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis Paper Considers States’ Experience Regarding 
Formula Apportionment, 1999 WTD 182-23 (Sept. 21, 1999). 
 158 As a business structure, MNEs flourish in those industries where the 
integrated multi-jurisdictional group structure enables them to internalize efficiently a 
variety of the group’s (collective) costs — such as transaction costs, research and 
development costs, information obtaining costs, and management costs. Hence, tax 
authorities find it difficult to directly assign MNEs’ collective costs and profits to any 
specific corporate entity operating in a certain jurisdiction. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International 
Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 149–50 (1995); Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective 
Policies for Foreign Direct Investment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS 208, 221 (1985); James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of 
Multinational Corporations 34–38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 5589, 1996), available at http://econpapers.hhs.se/ paper/nbrnberwo/5589.htm. 
 159 The arm’s-length standard’s endorsement by all tax regimes motivates MNEs 
to restructure their affiliated transactions’ contractual prices to report profits in 
corporations located in low-tax jurisdictions (MNEs may also be motivated to report 
profits in high-tax corporations, which have generated deductible losses about to 
expire). This tax reduction opportunity, open to MNEs through their range of 
international entities, enables them to curtail their tax expenses without instituting 
any fundamental alteration in the economic nature of their activities. 
 160 In an attempt to prevent the possibilities for abuse that arise from these 
conceptual deficiencies, transfer-pricing regulations often oblige MNEs to meet 
superficial (yet burdensome and rigorous) documentation standards in relation to 
their intra-group pricing methods. However, because of their incongruence with 
economic reality of integrated MNEs, transfer-pricing rules have a penumbra of 
abuse possibilities and uncertainties, which breed litigation and embroil the arm’s-
length standard with inherent inequities. See Towards and Internal Market Without 
Tax Obstacles, A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities, at 40, COM (2001) 582 final (Oct. 23,  
2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_ 
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In the related party finance realm, it is virtually impossible for tax 
authorities to unveil and systemize MNEs’ financial structures 
according to the arm’s-length standard. Pricing the “proper” interest 
rate of a specific related-debt transaction is a feasible task for the tax 
authorities of developed countries. However, tax authorities have no 
conceptual benchmark to determine whether the debt form of the 
transaction is proper, given the numerous alternatives available to 
taxpayers for mobilizing and repackaging fungible capital assets. This 
sourcing difficulty is compounded by the general difficulty of overly 
formalistic tax rules in dealing with sophisticated financial instruments 
according to obsolete debt versus equity distinctions. In light of these 
factors, it is evident that the arm’s-length standard is incapable of 
coherently sourcing affiliated financial transactions because there is 
no one “correct” and objective standard for allocating financial 
risks.161 Since it may be both analytically and practically difficult to 
retrieve the true economic substance of many affiliated financial 
transactions, MNEs may, through contractual machinations, skew the 
risks associated with those transactions (and their correlative returns) 
to favorable tax jurisdictions, even when no real economic risks are 
undertaken in those jurisdictions. As one prominent scholar has put it, 
the arm’s-length standard’s prima facie endorsement of affiliated 
transactions’ risk allocation schemes resulted in a “tax-planning free 
for all [regime].”162 
Second, in what has become known as treaty-shopping, 
sophisticated taxpayers are able to avoid unfavorable withholding 
taxes levied upon payments to nonresidents by channeling financial 
flows through conduit entities in jurisdictions with a favorable treaty 
 
0582en01.pdf (stating that there is evidence for aggressive transfer-pricing practices of 
both MNEs and tax authorities); Company Taxation in the Internal Market, at 261, 
268 SEC (2001) 1681 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_ 
customs/resources/documents/company_tax_study_en.pdf (noting that business sector 
representatives claim that the compliance burden of transfer-pricing and its ongoing 
incidents of double taxation are major IITR obstacles). 
 161 Gary D. Sprague, Application of Transfer Pricing Rules to Branches and 
Permanent Establishments — Electronic Commerce and Intangible Property Aspects, 
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 988 (2002). 
 162 Richard J. Vann, Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm’s-Length 
Principle, in THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES 142 (Brian 
J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville & Erick M. Zolt eds., 2003) (arguing, brilliantly, that the 
embedment of functional value creating factors within the transfer-pricing regimes, 
which was meant to retrieve economic substance, resulted in providing MNEs with 
great latitude to contractually allocate risks to low-tax jurisdictions to reduce their tax 
liability). 
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network.163 This way, taxpayers are able to extend withholding tax 
reductions, attained through such “treaty-havens,” to entities in 
jurisdictions with more conservative treaty policies.164 In response to 
these perceived abuses of the treaty network, it has become a 
common practice for some nations, most notably the United States, to 
include in their treaties a limitation-of-benefits clause.165 These clauses 
deal with situations in which nonresidents of the other signatory to the 
double taxation treaty disguise themselves as residents to attain treaty 
benefits.166 The United States has supplemented its treaty-shopping 
treaties’ provisions with an anti-conduit statutory legislation intended 
to counter conduit transactions that do not require creating a related 
entity.167 While both policies have been integrated in U.S. 
 
 163 These practices are facilitated mainly through developed countries with 
extensive treaty-networks (e.g., the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). MNEs 
and other international equity and debt investors may create a conduit entity in such 
“treaty-havens” to transfer funds through them.  
 164 For example, assume X is a corporation that resides in a country that has a 
double taxation treaty with the United Kingdom that eliminates withholding taxes. 
X’s country of residence does not have a double taxation treaty with the United 
States. X wants to provide a loan to an American corporation. If interest payments 
are paid directly to X from the American corporation, they will be subject to 30% 
withholding tax. However, if X establishes a U.K. subsidiary, invests the proceeds 
from the loan in that subsidiary, and then lends the money to the American 
corporation, interest payments made to the U.K. subsidiary by the American 
corporations would, absent an anti-treaty-shopping provision, be exempt from 
withholding tax rates under the 2003 version of the Treaty — even though they would 
eventually be redirected to X. More sophisticated versions of treaty-shopping are 
executed typically through the use of conduit companies, agency or trust 
arrangements, or the use of swap financial instruments, which divert the benefits of 
the payments from the resident (eligible for the reduced withholding tax rate) to a 
nonresident. 
 165 See, e.g., Treasury Dep’t, United States Model Income Tax Convention, art. 
22, Sept. 20, 1996, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 212.22; ISENBERGH, supra note 77, at 245–
46; Tillinghast, supra note 81, at 465–66 (noting that having a limitation of benefits 
provision has become “an inflexible U.S. demand in negotiation of any treaty”). 
 166 Limitation-of-benefits provisions are directed to counter conduit transactions 
made through corporate entities as well as agency and trust relationships. These 
provisions rely on ownership benchmarks, the nature of the business activity 
undertaken by the entities, and the tax avoidance purpose of the transactions. See 
United States Model Income Tax Convention, supra note 165, art. 22. 
 167 I.R.C. § 7701(l); Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (1995); Timothy S. Guenther, Tax 
Treaties and Overrides: The Multiple-Party Financing Dilemma, 16 VA. TAX REV. 645, 
661–63 (1997) (explaining the main attributes of the conduit regulations); Tillinghast, 
supra note 81, at 463. The regulations counter financing transactions, which are part 
of a tax avoidance plan to reduce withholding taxes through intermediated entities 
even if those entities are not related to either the financing or financed entities. The 
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international tax policy, doubt has risen over their effective 
enforcement in light of high negotiation costs,168 complexity,169 and 
enormous information-finding and litigation costs not available to tax 
authorities.170 Although the problems associated with conduit 
transactions apply to all taxpayers, the mechanisms developed to 
counter them are less effective when dealing with MNEs. Large 
MNEs typically have real economic activities in many treaty-havens 
and a difficult to trace transactional network with various financial 
institutions. 
C.  The (Counter) Earnings-Stripping Regimes 
1.  Two Approaches for Filtering Abusive Related Debt 
In discussing earnings-stripping (or thin-capitalization as it is 
called outside the United States) the OECD has emphasized two 
common approaches to uncover inappropriate related-debt 
transactions.171 The first is an arm’s-length standard approach, in 
which the earnings-stripping regime’s interest deduction limitation is 
triggered when it is determined that a specific related-debt transaction 
would not have been undertaken by unrelated parties. This approach 
confronts potentially inappropriate transactions through cumbersome, 
case-by-case evidentiary inquiries. The multifactor, hypothetical 
 
simplest example of such transaction would be a back-to-back loan. See id. at 463. In 
this scenario a foreign lender passes funds to a (related or unrelated) borrower 
through a financial institution that is a resident of the jurisdiction that has favorable 
treaties with both the lender and borrower’s jurisdictions. The financial institution 
receives a deposit of a certain amount from the lender and shortly after lends a similar 
amount to the depositor. The interest rate and duration of both debt contracts are 
similar and the financial institution will typically have some type of recourse against 
the lender to insure against the debtor’s credit risk. This allows the lender and the 
debtor to avoid withholding taxes and leaves the financial institution with a relatively 
small, yet costless, profit. In the absence of a smoking gun, it is doubtful whether 
back-to-back transactions could be spotted effectively by tax authorities. 
 168 Colon, supra note 76, at 821–22, 829 (noting that the treaty-shopping problem 
was only settled in the extremely long limitation of benefits provision in the United 
States’ double taxation treaty with the Netherlands; it took the countries twelve years 
of negotiation to resolve the controversies arising from the ambiguity of the limitation 
of treaty benefits provision). 
 169 ISENBERGH, supra note 77, at 254 (noting that the most primitive practice of 
earnings-stripping tax planning survives the anti-conduit legislation). 
 170 Tillinghast, supra note 81, at 461. 
 171 OECD, THIN CAPITALISATION, TAXATION OF ENTERTAINERS, ARTISTES AND 
SPORTSMEN 29–31 (1987). 
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nature of this inquiry narrows significantly the idea of inappropriate 
debt to include, exclusively, related-debt transactions with terms 
inconsistent with a debtor’s credit rating.172 
Under the second “ratio approach,” the interest deduction 
limitation is triggered once a relevant party fails to meet a certain 
debt-equity safe-harbor ratio. This ratio could be designed to focus on 
the debtor’s total indebtedness or its indebtedness against a specific 
related shareholder’s portfolio.173 
The OECD’s absolute adherence to the arm’s-length standard, as 
the sole sourcing methodology of affiliated transactions,174 could be 
understood, in part, by its concern that anti-avoidance sourcing 
mechanisms will pave the way for discriminatory tax treatment of 
foreign inbound debt investments and investors. As discussed earlier, 
a key objective of treaties is to prevent tax discrimination of source 
jurisdictions against foreigners.175 In the earnings-stripping context, 
there is an almost-explicit invalidation of this norm, since the heavier 
tax burden is directly targeted at domestic entities with foreign 
shareholder-creditors.176 
 
 172 See generally Tim Edgar, The Thin Capitalization Rules: Role and Reform, 40 
CAN. TAX J. 1, 30 (1992). 
 173 Ruud A. Sommerhalder, Approaches to Thin Capitalization, 36 EUR. TAX’N 
82, 83 (1996) (providing some examples of countries implementing this type of debt-
ratio). 
 174 OECD, supra note 171, at 29–32. 
 175 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 24, Jan. 28, 
2003 (prohibiting a number of scenarios in which the source country may discriminate 
against nationals of another country that reside in it, permanent establishments, and 
enterprises owned by foreigners). 
 176 The OECD’s position on earnings-stripping aligns with its general aversion to 
any sourcing arrangement that may grant the source jurisdiction the right to 
differentiate enterprises related to foreign investors from domestic investors. It is 
feared that if the source states will be granted the right to make such differentiation, it 
would allow them to expropriate taxes in an unaccountable and inequitable manner. 
One other important aspect of this aversion is the adherence of the OECD to the 
arm’s-length standard principle. To a large extent, this is driven by the fear that 
source jurisdictions will misuse formulary systems to allocate income in an unjust 
manner. Fred C. de Hosson & Geerten M.M. Michielse, Treaty Aspects of the ‘Thin 
Capitalisation’ Issue — A Review of the OECD Report, 11 INTERTAX 476, 484 (1989) 
(criticizing the earnings-stripping regimes as violating anti-discrimination treaty 
obligations); Jack M. Mintz, Globalization of the Corporate Income Tax: The Role of 
Allocation, 56 FINANZARCHIV 388, 393–94 (1999) (discussing the issue of tax 
expropriation through formulary allocation methods). 
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Whether specific earnings-stripping regimes violate treaty anti-
discrimination norms is a complicated discussion.177 That discussion is 
not covered in detail here because it is relevant primarily to questions 
dealing with the hierarchy of treaty law and national legislation.178 
Thus, it contributes less to the inquiry of this article regarding the 
intellectual undercurrents affecting interest taxation.179 
2.  The Nature of the Interest Deduction Limitation 
The first form of limitation, often criticized as being most likely to 
result in double taxation,180 is disallowance of interest deductions. 
Interest deduction disallowance results in the recognition of more 
income on the source (corporate) level while interest payments are 
presumably subject to tax on the foreign shareholder-creditor’s level 
as well. A more lenient version of this form is to defer the deduction 
of disallowed interest. The second option is the re-characterization of 
interest payments to related parties as dividends. Under this system, 
payments are subject to source (corporate) tax. Double taxation is 
thus avoided only if tax authorities in the shareholder-creditor’s 
country of residence endorse the re-characterization181 by granting 
relief for extra taxes paid on the source level. The shareholder-
 
 177 It involves questions of legislative versus treaty priority and questions of 
legislative interpretation. 
 178 See discussion infra note 223. 
 179 Forceful arguments that (for tax purposes) foreign (debt) investors are 
differently situated from domestic investors could be made. See Shay et al., supra note 
9, at 115. Nevertheless, the fact that (almost) by definition earnings-stripping regimes 
signal and penalize foreign investment strengthens the OECD’s position. These 
institutional considerations could serve as a partial explanation for the endorsement 
of the arm’s-length approach by many earnings-stripping regimes. This endorsement 
is frequently manifested through exceptions provided to related-debt transactions that 
are proven to be made on an arm’s-length basis (e.g., the case of Australia and 
Germany earnings-stripping regimes), or by the incorporation of arm’s-length 
benchmarks into the ratio formula (e.g., the U.S. earnings-stripping regime 
(USESR)), as discussed below. 
 180 Nathan Boidman, Inversions, Earnings Stripping — Thin Capitalization and 
Related Matters — An International Perspective, 29 TAX NOTES INT’L 879, 895–96, 904 
(Feb. 24, 2003); Robert J. Misey, Jr., An Unsatisfactory Response to the International 
Problem of Thin Capitalization: Can Regulations Save the Earnings Stripping 
Provision?, 81 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 171, 202 (1990) (bringing to attention the 
impact of re-characterization on related matters such as the computation of E&P in 
the case of the United States). 
 181 Lars-Erik Wenehed, Thin Capitalization and EC Law, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 
1145, 1149 (May 26, 2003). 
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creditor’s tax consequences under this approach, however, depend on 
a number of additional factors.182 Assuming a constant limitation 
amount, and putting aside differences arising from different 
withholding tax rates on debt and equity, the tax consequences for the 
debtor-corporate entity are similar under the disallowance and re-
characterization regimes. In cases where there is more than one 
shareholder, the burden of the additional source corporate tax liability 
is borne not only by the shareholder providing the “illegitimate” loan, 
but by all shareholders.183 
VI.  THE USESR AS A CASE-STUDY: A CRITIQUE OF THE ANTI-
AVOIDANCE PHASE 
A critical analysis of the USESR, as a case study, dovetails nicely 
with the article’s historical analysis. First, the USESR subscribes to 
the anti-avoidance paradigm in the sense that it tries to define, and 
differentiate between, “illegitimate” (motivated by abusive tax 
avoidance) and legitimate (debt) transactions. Second, it deals with 
the primary problem manifested during the Anti-Avoidance Phase — 
taxpayer ability to manipulate tax consequences through related party 
transactions. Third, it deals with the source allocation consequences of 
interest. Finally, the article maintains that the USESR is a reflection 
of the anti-avoidance paradigm as a whole. It incorporates the notion 
that the core difficulty with the IITR sourcing conventions is their 
inability to deal with the transactional abusiveness associated with 
cross-border related party activities. As the article demonstrates, this 
notion is too narrowly framed and, paradoxically, even insufficient to 
attain its own goals of coherently and equitably sourcing related party 
 
 182 These factors include, for example, the disparity between withholding taxes 
laid on interest and dividends, the treatment of foreign sourced dividend by the 
shareholder’s country of residence, the level of shareholder corporate integration, and 
the classification of re-characterized related-debt transactions in which the lender is 
the subsidiary. 
 183 In both cases, a similarly higher corporate tax is levied on the source level, 
thus reducing the relative net worth of the holdings of (all) the debtor’s shareholders 
(including those who are not considered related parties), rather than recouping the 
revenue lost only from those shareholders engaged in the earnings-stripping. For 
example, assume a corporation with two foreign shareholders each holding 50% of its 
equity. One of the shareholders provides the corporation with a loan. Assume further 
that some interest payments made under the shareholder’s loan are re-characterized 
as dividends (or denied a deductions) under the earnings-stripping rules of the 
corporation’s source jurisdiction. This will deny the deduction of those interest 
payments and is thus likely to result in a higher corporate income tax liability that will 
affect both shareholders. 
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debt-finance transactions. The article’s focus on the IITR necessarily 
dictates that the USESR’s implications on domestic tax-exempt 
organizations be left out of the article’s discussion. 
A.  The USESR: Some Basic Operational Attributes 
The 1945 U.S.-U.K. double taxation treaty was the first to 
delineate an earnings-stripping regime.184 The current USESR is 
defined in section 163(j) enacted in 1989. To fully understand the 
inadequacies of the Anti-Avoidance Phase embedded in the USESR, 
it is first important to understand its three main attributes. 
1.  Types of Debt Contracts Subject to the USESR 
The USESR only limits the deductibility of what it defines as 
“disqualified interest.”185 Disqualified interest is interest arising from 
inbound debt investments made by controlling shareholders, which, in 
the Code, are referred to as related parties.186 The income is 
“disqualified” only if the shareholders are exempt — in whole or in 
part — from U.S. income taxation (including withholding taxes).187 
 
 184 The Treaty established a basic earnings-stripping regime because its 
negotiators acknowledged taxpayers’ ability to manipulate the discontinuity between 
the withholding tax it laid on dividends and the exemption from withholding taxes on 
interest. This earnings-stripping regime allowed both jurisdictions to limit the 
exemption from withholding source taxes on interest in cases of affiliated lending 
when the foreign creditor had a 50% voting interest in the debtor corporation. See 
The Treaty, supra note 90, art. VII. 
 185 I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A). 
 186 I.R.C. § 163(j)(4)(A) (defining related parties as parties with at least 50% 
ownership stake in the corporate (debtor) taxpayer); I.R.C. § 163(j)(4)(B) 
(determining that while only corporations (and branches of corporate entities) could 
be subjected as debtors to the USESR, partners could be considered as related 
lenders); I.R.C. § 163(j)(5)(A) (containing rules for determining whether the interest 
was subject to tax on the partner level); I.R.C. § 163(j)(4)(B)(i) (providing a de 
minimis rule that does not disqualify a partnership that otherwise would be 
considered a related person if less than 10% of the profits and capital interests are 
held by a taxpayer not subject to U.S. tax); I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(C) (affiliated groups are 
treated as a single taxpayer). 
 187 I.R.C. § 163(j)(3)(A). In cases in which treaties reduce but do not eliminate 
withholding taxes, these reductions are treated as partial tax-exemptions. See I.R.C. § 
163(j)(5)(B). Thus, the proportion of interest which is disqualified equals the 
proportional reduction from the 30% withholding tax statutory rate. For example, if 
through a double taxation treaty the withholding tax rate on interest was reduced to 
10%, then two-thirds of the interest payments made by an American corporation to a 
related foreign taxpayer would be disqualified. 
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The USESR also covers interest arising from some related-debt 
equivalents (e.g., debt guaranteed by related parties).188 It is important 
to recognize that operating within this mandate limits the scope of the 
USESR to consider only the appropriateness of intra-group debt-
finance transactions. Therefore, it does not cover those cases in which 
MNEs disproportionately189 leverage activities of (presumably highly-
taxed) American subsidiaries with unrelated debt. 
2.  Defining (Fiscally) Inappropriate Debt Payments 
To filter inappropriate related party debt transactions, the 
USESR employs two safe-harbors: the debt-equity ratio and the 
permissibility of interest deductions of up to 50% of adjusted taxable 
income (the ATI Standard). Such a dual filtering system, of employing 
ratio and (quasi) arm’s-length scrutiny standards jointly, situates the 
USESR in the middle path between the two extremes.190 Interestingly, 
both standards use corporate unrelated-debt or interest payments 
 
 188 The USESR is not restricted to apply only to direct related-debt transactions 
but also extends to what may be coined “related-debt equivalents.” The relative 
broadness by which the concept of relatedness is defined under the USESR is 
manifested in the following respects: First, the benchmark of 50% ownership interest, 
which lenders must have in order to be considered as related to the corporation, is 
computed according to the related party rules. I.R.C. § 163(j)(4) (making a cross-
reference to sections 267(b) and 707(b)(1)). Second, the USESR recognizes indirect 
(conduit) interest payments as disqualified interest. I.R.C. § 163(j)(3)(A) (using the 
wording of “any interest paid or accrued by the taxpayer (directly or indirectly),” this 
provision seems to be attentive to the ability to bypass the USESR by simple back-to-
back transactions (emphasis added)). In the absence of guiding earnings-stripping 
regulations, this seems to be the only statutory anchor within section 163(j) to refute 
the earnings-stripping potential of these types of transactions. Third, with a small 
exception, the 1993 amendment of the USESR recognized interest payments arising 
from debt guaranteed by a foreign related party as disqualified interest. I.R.C. § 
163(j)(3)(B), (6)(D); I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(D)(ii) (contending that if the debtor has a 
80%+ interest in the foreign guarantor then interest paid under the debt contract is 
not disqualified). In my opinion, granting the section 163(j)(6)(D)(ii) exception is 
wrong since it disregards the ability of a MNE to obtain deferral benefits and/or to 
obtain stripping benefits through double stripping transactions. See also Sanford H. 
Goldberg & Charles E. Valliere, Selected US Tax Developments: US Earnings-
Stripping Rules Extended to Loans Guaranteed by Related Parties, 41 CAN. TAX J. 828, 
831 (1993). 
 189 In comparison to the leverage applied to entities located in low-tax 
jurisdictions. 
 190 Robert E. Culbertson & Jaime E. King, U.S. Rules on Earnings Stripping: 
Background, Structure, and Treaty Interaction, 29 TAX NOTES INT’L 1161, 1169 (Mar. 
24, 2003). 
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(that typically enjoy per se legitimacy) as indicators to determine 
whether the disqualified interest disallowance should be triggered. 
First, deductions of any disqualified interest are unlimited so long 
as taxpayer debt-equity ratios do not exceed a ratio of 1.5:1.191 This 
comparatively low debt-equity ratio standard192 means that only 
companies from typically low-leveraged industries fall within the safe-
harbor provision.193 Thus, the safe-harbor allows taxpayers operating 
in traditionally low-leveraged sectors (e.g., start-ups and retailers), 
that are solely indebted to related parties, to fly well below the 
USESR’s radar. On the other hand, the USESR may penalize other 
taxpayers with relatively low percentages of related debt operating in 
highly leveraged industries (e.g., manufacturing). As discussed later, 
this blunts the USESR’s anti-abusive scrutiny blade. 
Second, the deduction of disqualified interest is only limited to 
the excess amount by which net interest expenses194 exceed 50% of the 
 
 191 I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)(ii), (C). The equity is computed with reference to the tax 
base of corporate assets. I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(C)(i). Because of accelerated tax 
depreciation, the emphasis on tax base reduces the value of the equity figure. 
Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 654 (arguing that the safe-harbor would 
apply mainly to corporations that are constantly engaged in purchasing assets). 
 192 Grant Richardson, Dean Hanlon & Les Nethercott, Thin Capitalization Rules: 
An Anglo American Comparison, 24 INT’L TAX J. 36, 59 (1998). 
 193 For example, assume there are two corporations, both with a foreign 
shareholder. The first corporation is a start-up in the internet communication 
technology field. Since start-ups have the tendency of failing without leaving any 
tangible assets for their creditors to claim, ordinary commercial lenders will be 
reluctant to provide the start-up corporation with loans due to the enormous credit 
risk it would involve. Any investor in the start-up will wish to compensate the risk it is 
incurring with high rates of return, which are typically attained through equity or 
hybrid financial investments and not through loans. The second corporation is an 
industrial one operating in a well-established traditional sector. It requires substantial 
preliminary investments, which in part would be financed by loans, since lenders can 
better estimate its credit risk and could issue it recourse loans relying on its tangible 
holdings. Thus, if the start-up corporation had a debt-equity ratio of 1.4:1, its interest 
deductions would not be deferred under the USESR even if all of its loans were made 
by related parties, though this would be considered a high leverage level for a start-
up. Additionally, if the industrial corporation had a 1.6:1 debt-equity ratio, it would 
not fall under the safe-harbor even though this would be considered a low level of 
leverage for this type of corporation. Furthermore, the industrial corporation will fail 
to enter the safe-harbor even if only a small fraction of its debt was made by its 
shareholders. 
 194 I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(B) (defining the term net interest expense as the excess of 
interest expenses accrued during the fiscal year over the interest payments includable 
in the taxpayer’s gross income in that year). 
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adjusted taxable income (ATI).195 This link between the ATI and the 
permissible level of interest deductions arises because the ATI is 
considered a rough approximation of cash flow.196 Cash flow is widely 
held to be the primary criterion by which unrelated lenders determine 
the ability of potential debtors to service debt.197 Accordingly, the ATI 
Standard is an indirect attempt to create a filtering mechanism that, 
while using objective measurements, is sensitive to the type of 
considerations taken by unrelated parties entering into debt 
transactions.198 Since many taxpayers fail to meet the debt-equity safe-
harbor, much of the USESR’s ability to delineate a robust conception 
of inappropriate related-debt financing practices hinges on the ATI 
Standard’s operation.199 
3.  Treatment of Inappropriate Debt Payments 
The USESR limitation on the deduction of interest payments may 
not exceed the lower of (1) the interest excess over the ATI Standard 
or (2) the amount of recognized disqualified interest. Attentive to 
business cycle volatility, the USESR employs a carryover provision 
with no time limits. Thus, the USESR does not disallow interest 
deductions but only defers them to future periods in which its net 
interest deductions are less than the ATI Standard’s prescribed 
amount.200 
 
 195 I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)(i), (B). To avoid penalizing corporations with temporary 
decline in revenues, the excess in interest expense may be reduced by offsetting it 
with unused existing excess limitation carryforwards from three previous fiscal years. 
See also I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(B)(iii) (the excess limitation is computed in a manner that 
mirrors essentially the computation of excess interest expenses). 
 196 James E. Croker, Jr. & Henry J. Birnkrant, Earnings-Stripping Prop. Regs. 
Raise the Level of Complexity for Related-Party Debt, 75 J. TAX’N 244, 245 (1991); 
Harry L. Gutman, Thomas A. Stout, Jr., Paul M. Schmidt & Katherine Breaks, 
KPMG Urges Reconsideration of Proposals Regarding Earnings-Stripping Provision, 
2003 TNT 84-13 (2003). To entrench this approximation empirically, the USESR 
provides a number of significant modifications to the way in which the adjusted 
taxable income (ATI) is to be calculated by taxpayers (namely the add-backs of 
depreciation amortization and depletion expenses). See I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(A). 
 197 Croker, supra note 196, at 245–47. 
 198 Culbertson & King, supra note 190, at 1169. 
 199 Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 653–56. 
 200  .C.R.I § 163(j)(1)(B). Along with the excess limitation, this interest deduction 
deferment (until the taxpayer’s ATI justifies the deduction) provides taxpayers with 
an averaging mechanism for USESR purposes. 
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B.  A Critical Analysis of the USESR 
This Part engages in a critical assessment of the USESR’s 
performance, through which it demonstrates that the anti-avoidance 
paradigm’s objectives are a stopgap measure. As the result of its 
failure to effectively define transactional legitimacy, the paradigm 
offers no institutional salvage to the difficulties of sourcing affiliated 
financial transactions in the face of complexity and abuse. I carve the 
performance question into two analyses: (1) the effectiveness of the 
USESR in protecting the corporate tax base from erosion and (2) its 
ability to detect (and, as a byproduct, deter) abusive debt-finance 
practices. 
1.  Lack of Effectiveness in Preventing the Tax Base Erosion 
The ineffectiveness of the USESR in preventing corporate tax 
base erosion arises from the carryover provisions and the ATI 
Standard. First, as mentioned above, many believed that the ATI (as 
an indicator of cash flow) provides a measure that correlates with the 
corporate capacity to incur periodic interest payments.201 However, 
the imperfections of the ATI Standard,202 along with taxpayer ability 
to artificially maximize the ATI (without increasing taxable 
income),203 reduced the protective aptitude of this criterion. By 
allowing corporations to deduct net interest expenses up to 50% of 
ATI, the USESR permits profitable corporations to engage in high 
levels of related leverage without being affected. Additionally, the 
USESR’s emphasis on the ATI prescribes that corporations with high 
levels of interest income, mainly financial institutions, are also 
practically exempt from the USESR.204 The USESR’s impact on loss 
 
 201 Misey, supra note 180, at 199. 
 202 These imperfections, to a certain extent, could be attributed to the lack of 
precise regulations. 
 203 Andrea Shaham-Mendell, Planning Alternatives to the Earnings Stripping 
Provisions of Section 163(j), 70 TAXES 696, 700–01 (1992) (providing a number of 
examples for how this may be attained such as buying an asset entitled to large 
depreciation/amortization that will not only offset the income it produces but also 
artificially increase the ATI, or investment in a diversified portfolio in which the 
taxpayers will enjoy components that will be included in its ATI but not in its taxable 
income (dividends subjected to dividend exemptions)); Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra 
note 15, at 688–92 (providing a number of examples such as the purchase of assets 
producing interest income as a technique that will provide the corporation with more 
equity and more ATI — and which would allow it to reduce its net interest expenses). 
 204 Diana L. Wollman, Recent U.S. Earning Stripping Proposals: Why Were the 
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corporations, which defer much of their interest deductions anyway, is 
already limited. However, the USESR’s carryover arrangement also 
severely limits its impact on companies with fluctuating ATIs, which 
are able to deduct the differed disqualified interest deductions in 
future years. All this essentially implies that the USESR has a very 
limited scope and that it affects only a narrow group of mildly 
profitable corporate taxpayers failing chronically to meet up to the 
ATI Standard. 
Second, the idea that the USESR was intended sincerely to 
provide a buffer against U.S. corporate tax avoidance through high 
leverage is in variance with the restrictive definition of disqualified 
interest. By restricting its scrutiny to related debt (and debt 
guaranteed by related parties) only, the USESR fails to respond to 
major concerns over earnings-stripping practices involving 
disproportionately high levels of leverage of MNEs’ American 
subsidiaries. If one accepts that, economically, all the debt incurred by 
an integrated MNE’s entities is supported jointly by all of its assets,205 
then the USESR does little to prevent MNEs from financing U.S. 
operations through unrelated debt while financing operations in low-
tax jurisdictions through equity investments.206 This problem of 
disproportionate leverage has been identified as a major source of 
concern by other tax regimes,207 as well as by recent bills that sought to 
amend the USESR.208 
Discussions over the USESR erupted recently, in 2002, in light of 
the relatively high number of corporate inversion transactions. These 
involved replacements of American parent corporations with foreign 
surrogates located in tax-havens with little or no impact on inverting 
MNEs’ actual business.209 
 
Doctors Called and Is the Medicine Worse than the Disease?, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 483, 
493 (May 5, 2003). 
 205 This premise is already supported by some Code sections. See infra note 226. 
 206 There is one significant exception to this, see supra note 188. The USESR 
counters foreign disproportionate leverage when the American corporation’s debt to 
an unrelated party is guaranteed by a foreign related person. 
 207 This is namely a concern of the Australian and New Zealand earnings-
stripping regimes. See Andrew M.C. Smith & Paul V. Dunmore, New Zealand’s Thin 
Capitalization Rules and the Arm’s Length Principle, 57 BULL. INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 503 (2003); Michael Wachtel, Australia’s New Thin Capitalization 
Regime, 55 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 380 (2003). 
 208 Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals, 2003 TNT 23-11 (Feb. 3, 2003). 
 209 Desai & Hines, supra note 132 (analyzing the types and magnitudes of the tax 
savings sought by inverting corporations); Hal Hicks, Overview of Inversion 
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Inverting corporations sought long-term tax saving by avoiding 
subpart F anti-deferral legislation and engaging in earnings-stripping 
through injection of related party debt into former U.S. parents and 
their subsidiaries.210 Inverted MNEs thus admitted openly (in SEC 
filings and communications with shareholders) that they intended to 
utilize the inversions not only to avoid paying U.S. taxes on foreign 
earnings, but also to use earnings-stripping practices to avoid paying 
taxes on U.S. source incomes. Moreover, it became evident that 
invertors were trying to attain tax advantages blatantly possessed by 
all (genuinely) foreign MNEs doing business in the United States 
through subsidiaries.211 
In sum, the USESR does not alter incentives available to foreign 
MNEs for leveraging U.S. subsidiary financing.212 Additionally, it is 
incomplete, since it grants MNEs the ability to substitute related-debt 
transactions with other types of related-capital funding transactions to 
attain the same stripping effect.213 Most notably, the USESR fails to 
address the issue of disproportionate leverage. In view of these 
shortcomings, the USESR is an inadequate measure to prevent 
corporate tax base erosion due to interest deductions. 
 
Transactions: Selected Historical, Contemporary, and Transactional Perspectives, 30 
TAX NOTES INT’L 899 (June 2, 2003) (providing an analysis of the main features of the 
last wave of inversions). 
 210 Desai & Hines, supra note 132; Drawing Lines Around Corporate Inversion, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2270, 2278 (2005) (suggesting that the biannual revenue loss in 
fiscal year 2002–2003 as a result of earnings-stripping by four inverting corporations 
was estimated to be 700 million USD); Hicks, supra note 209, at 907, 915–16. 
 211 This initiated legislative proposals that eventually did not materialize into 
legislation. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., TECHNICAL 
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2896, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2003” 76–78 
(Joint Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-72-03.pdf; STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., MODIFICATION FO THE CHAIRMAN’S 
MARK ON THE “JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH (JOBS) ACT” 48 (Joint Comm. 
Print 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-85-03.pdf; Andrew N. Berg, 
NYSBA Comments on Proposals to Modify Earnings-Stripping Rules, 2003 TNT 178-
49 (Sept. 12, 2003) (providing a thorough discussion on the various legislatives 
proposals to amend the USESR). 
 212 Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 675–76 (suggesting a model that 
analyzes the incentives of different corporations to engage in related-debt financing 
and demonstrating that the USESR really “hits” firms only in very remote scenarios). 
 213 Id. at 686 (discussing a number of examples (e.g., replacement of debt with 
third party leases) and stressing that tax authorities will find it much more difficult to 
challenge earnings-stripping techniques that do not depend on interest payments). 
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2.  The USESR’s Failure in Deterring Abusive Related-Debt 
Transactions 
Since tax base erosion is often a byproduct of successful 
avoidance schemes, the article’s differentiation between the notions of 
anti-avoidance and anti-erosion merits explanation. Although these 
two topics are indivisible in many senses, there is a qualitative 
difference of emphasis between them. While anti-erosion effects are 
measured in terms of bottom-line revenue outcomes, the performance 
of anti-avoidance mechanisms is measured by the USESR’s ability to 
signal out technical attributes of transactions, which are structured in 
a manner indicative of inappropriate tax avoidance motivations. This 
distinction is useful because it explains why tax authorities often 
combat certain types of practices while openly allowing others that 
may have similar revenue effects.214 
Thus, the Anti-Avoidance Phase paradigm aimed to set a 
behavioral standard for tax professionals regarding the limits of using 
IITR’s incongruence for tax planning purposes. This type of 
principled behavioral message is necessary, as a tax policy tool, 
because of the infinite number of abuse and manipulation possibilities 
contained in the Code. More specifically, in the context of related 
transactions, this behavioral message is necessary to counter abuse 
possibilities spawned by the inadequacies of the arm’s-length 
 
 214 For example, the Service has tried for many years to block treaty-shopping 
practices through litigation and diplomacy. In 1987, the United States unilaterally 
canceled its double taxation treaty with the Netherlands-Antilles, which for many 
years was used as a loophole by American corporations that were trying to reduce 
withholding taxes on their Eurobond borrowings. Convention Between the United 
States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Neth., Aug. 8, 1986, 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 6657 (expired 
June 29, 1987).The double taxation treaty was revoked three years after the portfolio 
tax exemption was made available to all U.S. corporations that wished to issue bonds 
on the Eurobond markets. The distinction between anti-avoidance and anti-erosion 
could explain the apparent policy inconsistency. While anti-erosion rationales would 
have probably dictated the revocation of the double taxation treaty and the denial of 
the exemption, anti-avoidance rationales would have only dictated the former. Anti-
avoidance rationales prescribe that the Netherlands-Antilles loophole should be 
closed because it provided inverse incentives to engage in “dodgy” tax planning and 
benefited those taxpayers willing to engage in manipulative conduit transactions. A 
similar scenario may well be on its way right now. The Treasury and Congress have 
spent considerable resources trying to counter corporate inversions, at precisely the 
same time as there is a growing readiness to shift to a territorial tax system. I.R.C. § 
7874. 
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standard. By and large, the validity of the distinction between anti-
avoidance and anti-erosion rationales depends on one’s view as to 
whether preventing taxpayer “self help” is a legitimate tax authority 
objective. Anti-avoidance rationales aim to deter taxpayers from 
exploiting certain tax reduction opportunities. Although some 
(legitimate) tax reduction opportunities are available to all taxpayers, 
the anti-avoidance paradigm seeks to deter and de-legitimize, yet not 
criminalize, certain tax reduction opportunities. These opportunities 
are distinguished by their availability only to well-advised and affluent 
taxpayers. This provides a strong policy ground for supporting anti-
avoidance objectives, independent of anti-erosion rationales. Anti-
avoidance policy rationales may include democratic considerations 
regarding the equitable distribution of the tax burden. More 
profoundly, those policy rationales raise concerns with regard to the 
prospects of yielding good tax policies through the democratic 
process. Once tax avoidance practices afford affluent taxpayers a 
lower tax burden, they have low incentives to mobilize or support a 
tax reform process to yield superior alternatives.215 
The inquiry whether the USESR has successfully targeted abusive 
related-debt finance transactions is rendered difficult by the 
amorphousness of the anti-avoidance paradigm’s “inappropriateness” 
standard. However, the article argues that the two safe-harbors 
through which the USESR filters related-debt transactions provide an 
unintuitive notion of “inappropriateness.” 
First, the debt-equity safe-harbor is an arbitrary “golden panoply” 
applied across the board to all industries. Derivatively, this prescribes 
insensitivity to any “inappropriateness” in the tax avoidance 
motivation of taxpayers operating in low-leveraged industries. Some 
of these taxpayers can fall within the safe-harbor’s ambit, even 
though, solely for tax reasons, a significant portion of their financing is 
made through related party debts. One must note that tax 
administration considerations may justify adopting a universal (rather 
than an industry-specific) ratio.216 Despite these considerations, the 
USESR debt-equity ratio still seems ill-suited to identify tax 
avoidance motivation because of its reliance on both related and 
unrelated debt. An attempt to root out transactions motivated by tax 
 
 215 Once most of the wealthy taxpayers are de facto exempt from a burdensome 
tax arrangement (because of avoidance opportunities they can afford to employ), 
there is likely to be less effective pressure on the political system to reform the 
burdensome arrangement for the benefit of all taxpayers. 
 216 An industry-specific ratio will require defining different industry 
classifications and will be more susceptible to lobby groups’ influence. 
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avoidance mandates fixing a shareholder-specific (related) debt-
equity ratio. This ratio, which examines each related shareholders’ 
relative debt and equity interests in the debtor corporation, resonates 
with specific (controlling) shareholder motivation to engage in 
earnings-stripping much more so than a general debt-equity ratio. 
Second, the ATI Standard’s operation as a filtering mechanism 
mandates that highly profitable corporations, corporations with high-
gross interest income, and/or corporations operating in noncapital-
intensive sectors, are in most cases beyond the reach of USESR 
penalty.217 This is true even with corporations in which related debt is 
a main avenue for finance. Furthermore, in many cases, the impact of 
the USESR interest deduction limitation is determined according to 
factors of profitability and cash flow (to the extent that both are 
represented by the ATI). Both cash flow and profitability are highly 
volatile, unpredictable, and dependent on many factors. Accordingly, 
the linkage between the ATI Standard and abusive financing is in 
many senses unclear. If a subsidiary is under-capitalized with respect 
to equity-capital from its parent, there appears to be no policy 
objective mandating that the interest deduction limitation be 
implemented primarily in those periods when that corporation has a 
low ATI. 
An alternative line of criticism is that if the USESR intended to 
deter tax avoidance transactions, it has done so in an over-inclusive 
manner. As a crude unilateral mechanism applied across the board 
against all related-debt transactions, the USESR may result in double 
taxation of interest payments even if those payments lack avoidance 
motivation, since they are made to high-tax jurisdiction creditors.218 If 
the USESR genuinely intended to detect inappropriate avoidance 
schemes, it would have probably taken into account the effective tax 
rate on outbound interest payments in creditors’ residence 
jurisdictions (thus imitating treaty base solutions that involve 
limitation of withholding tax reductions).219 This argument is 
strengthened by the under representation of factors considered as 
proxies for tax abusive intentions in the USESR. It leads to the 
conclusion that the USESR fails to signal out, and therefore deter, 
many avoidance motivated, inbound affiliated debt transactions. 
 
 217 Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 659–61. 
 218 Boidman, supra note 180, at 903–04; Derek A. Burgess & James B. 
Penlington, Earnings-Stripping Trap, 35 TAX ADVISER 545, 545 (2004). 
 219 Renfroe et al., supra note 72. 
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C.  The USESR’s Failure and the Limitations of the Anti-Avoidance 
Paradigm 
The analysis above suggests that the USESR’s quandaries arise 
from the manner through which it perceives the problematic nature of 
the earnings-stripping phenomenon. By exclusively associating the 
earnings-stripping problem with narrowly defined related finance 
transactions, the USESR exhibits much of the analytical flaws and 
harmful consequences of the Anti-Avoidance Phase paradigm. As 
mentioned previously, related debt is a legal fiction. Accordingly, the 
USESR is problematic because of the constrained set of hypothetical 
inquiries, limited by the arm’s-length standard, through which it 
addresses this fiction (e.g., the ATI Standard).220 
Paradoxically, even if the arm’s-length standard could discern 
what an unrelated party would have done, it is unclear whether that 
would be sufficient to provide a normative framework upon which 
inappropriate related debt should be defined. The idea that something 
carried out by unrelated parties is per se appropriate when carried out 
by related parties is undermined by the fact that many unrelated 
parties prefer (for purely tax reasons) to package investments as debt 
rather than equity.221 While this tendency may not be a problem in 
itself, it begs the question whether the conduct of unrelated parties is 
an adequate benchmark for assessing related transaction validity. 
While affiliated-debt and unrelated transactions are subject to the 
same favorable tax consequences, affiliated-debt transactions are not 
truly subject to the high risks, especially credit risks, faced by 
unrelated creditors. 
This latter argument suggests that the attempt to dissect related-
debt earnings-stripping practices with arm’s-length standard scalpels 
misses more than just the integrated manner by which financial 
decisions are carried out within MNEs. It suggests that the 
fundamental problem with the USESR, and the anti-avoidance 
paradigm as a whole, is that it superficially distinguishes the issue of 
how to deal with tax avoidance transactions from the broader 
question of what the fair source return for (debt) investments should 
be. It assumes wrongly that preventing avoidance schemes would be 
sufficient to counter the harsh revenue impact of trade considerations 
on IITR’s sourcing conventions. 
 
 220 Rosenbloom, supra note 154, at 27 (providing an elaborated upon discussion 
regarding the role of hypothetical inquiries — with particular interest in the arm’s-
length standard). 
 221 Culbertson & King, supra note 190, at 1170. 
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It is first important to recognize that affiliated transactions do not 
fundamentally alter the question of what should be the fair source 
return for investments. Taxpayers’ attempts to run with the hares and 
hunt with the hounds by retaining corporate control over subsidiaries 
in high-tax jurisdictions while stripping their earnings into low-tax 
jurisdictions through debt finance just highlight the fact that the 
question remains unanswered. From the very beginning of the IITR, 
the issue of source jurisdictions’ adequate return for debt investments 
has never been resolved. As the article has demonstrated, this 
vagueness is reflected in many sourcing arrangements. Earnings-
stripping practices are signaled out by the simple and lucrative 
manner in which MNEs’ abuse this vagueness. This is one of the 
article’s main points. It goes against the common wisdom among tax 
scholars that the problem of sourcing related transactions is insulated 
from other pending sourcing difficulties in the IITR. The article 
acknowledges that the growing volumes of affiliated transactions in 
the last quarter century have altered materially the economic 
infrastructure to which the IITR relates, but points out that the origins 
of the difficulty in sourcing affiliated transactions are rooted more 
deeply in the historical development of sourcing conventions. 
It is noteworthy that MNEs’ ability to disproportionately leverage 
business activities in high-taxed jurisdictions proves that the potential 
of corporate income tax base erosion lies in affiliated settings — not 
exclusively in the tendency to shift income through affiliated 
transactions.222 Any future policy aiming to counter source base 
erosion tendencies should, therefore, go beyond the issue of pricing 
affiliated financial transactions and aim to provide a comprehensive 
solution of sourcing affiliated financial settings. 
On a more abstract level, MNEs’ ability to utilize tax-competitive 
environments to report income in low-tax jurisdictions eradicates the 
fig leaf covering the reciprocal nature of withholding tax reductions. 
The theory behind those reductions assumes that they help residence 
jurisdictions collect more revenues. However, the tax sensitive finance 
structures of MNEs refute the idea that reducing withholding taxes on 
debt financing results in a win-win situation for all nations (and 
taxpayers) involved. Such tax structures vindicate the Revenue 
 
 222 Evidence of the importance of this issue can be observed by some of the 
recent changes in the new anti-earnings-striping regimes (in Australia, New Zealand, 
and Germany), as well as the recent attempt of the Bush administration to change the 
USESR (which also targeted the problem of disproportionate leverage). See supra 
note 207 and 208. 
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Phase’s initial insight: that allocation of tax is, to a large extent, a zero 
sum game among different nations and investors. 
In many respects, the nonoptimal operation of the USESR could 
be attributed to its design as a crude backup to an amalgam of Trade 
Phase loopholes. Thus, rather than theorizing a legitimacy benchmark 
for affiliated-debt investments, the USESR’s cumbersome operation 
sought a crude (and remote) last line of defense against: (1) the 
difficulties in distinguishing between debt and equity in light of their 
often similar economic function and materially different tax 
consequences; (2) the imperfections of anti-treaty-shopping treaty 
arrangements; and, most importantly, (3) the practical and theoretical 
deficiencies of the arm’s-length standard in sourcing affiliated 
financial transactions. If one accepts this account, then one can only 
wonder why arm’s-length proxies were embedded in the USESR in 
the first place. 
The anti-avoidance paradigm of the USESR is subject to criticism 
not only for its low revenue yields, but also for infringing fundamental 
institutional constraints undertaken by the treaty network.223 Some of 
its critics consider the USESR to be inherently unfair, since it (1) 
unilaterally alters U.S. treaty obligations to address a problem that 
could have been addressed properly through treaty negotiations, and, 
in the case of more than one shareholder, (2) lays a tax burden on 
parties other than shareholders engaged in earnings-stripping tax 
avoidance practices.224 
I respectfully disagree with the above line of criticism. In my 
opinion, there is a qualitative difference between the earnings-
stripping regimes’ attempt to cap tax reduction by limiting abusive 
affiliated transactions and the overriding of treaty obligations. 
Treaties’ main objective is to facilitate a tax environment supportive 
of a broad array of cross-border transactions, not to prevent specific 
tax avoidance transactions. Accordingly, as a matter of public policy 
and treaty interpretation, it seems most plausible to argue that specific 
anti-avoidance arrangements should be left to national legislators. 
It is nevertheless important to recognize that the incorporation of 
the anti-avoidance rationale within the USESR positioned it in the 
 
 223 Throughout the different stages of its development, the USESR was criticized 
for being a “cheating” mechanism intended to override U.S. treaty obligations. See 
Anthony C. Infanti, Curtailing Tax Treaty Overrides: A Call to Action, 62 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 677, 682, 687–88 (2001) (claiming that the USESR is one of many overrides that 
are unfair, creates uncertainty, and harms U.S. reputation, thereby deterring other 
countries from entering into treaties with it); Roin, supra note 130, at 275–78. 
 224 Roin, supra note 130, at 289, 295. 
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crossfire of criticism from both sides of the barricade. Failing to 
restore effective fiscal sovereignty over mobile resources, the USESR 
is rumored to be wasteful, complicated, arbitrary, and ineffective. On 
the other hand, traversing the twilight zone of breaching treaties’ 
(Trade Phase) anti-discrimination obligations, others criticize the 
USESR for its discriminatory nature.225 Perhaps more than anything, 
the position of tax authorities, situated between the devil and the deep 
blue sea in the earnings-stripping context, is the prime example of the 
Anti-Avoidance Phase moral. The quest pursued by policymakers in 
the Anti-Avoidance Phase, to remedy Trade Phase tax erosion by 
identifying transactional attributes that render tax schemes 
inequitable, is futile. Mired in its practical and conceptual drawbacks, 
the anti-avoidance theme was (and still is) unable to offer a viable 
alternative to the (Trade Phase’s) status quo, let alone to dispel it. 
VII.  AN EPILOGUE AND A PROLOGUE 
A.  An Epilogue 
The story of the IITR has not yet been articulated. To the extent 
that it has, it was often portrayed (simplistically) as sagas of the north 
disinvesting the south of revenues, or as a story of policymakers’ 
capture. Through the example of the erosion of source taxes on 
inbound interest income, the article offers a profound and novel view 
suggesting that the history of sourcing is a history contoured by 
dominant business interests and policymakers’ myopia. 
As the developed world emerged from WWI into the Revenue 
Phase, the major problem, requiring the establishment of the IITR, 
was how to assure credible double taxation reduction in the face of 
mounting national needs for both tax revenue and foreign investment. 
The finalization of the League’s three draft conventions in 1928, each 
pursuing different sourcing doctrines, marks the capital-importing 
countries’ failure to establish a cartelized arrangement that 
guaranteed a minimal level of source return. The League’s failure to 
elicit a set of allocation — rather than coordination — IITR sourcing 
norms sparked the tax-competitive harmonization of source taxes. 
This process was most visible with regard to the reductions of source 
withholding tax rates on interest income during the Trade Phase. 
The Trade Phase began at the end of WWII when the main 
problem facing Western countries was how to structure an IITR that 
 
 225 George B. Delta, The New Earning Stripping Provision, 31 TAX MGM’T MEM. 
87, 91–92 (1990). 
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did not get in the way of inducing foreign trade. This stipulated 
objective aligned well with the broader political agenda of the time — 
to strengthen Western economies. This trade agenda endorsed the 
harmonization of withholding tax reduction. However, what began as 
a set of cautious treaty-based, reciprocal reductions in withholding 
taxes in the early days of the Trade Phase became, towards the mid-
1980s, a tooth and nail tax-competitive war for foreign investment (as 
exemplified in portfolio income exemptions). If, at the beginning of 
this process, it was believed that lower source taxation resulted in 
higher residency revenues, that conviction proved a false promise. It 
further became evident that even dominantly positioned countries 
such as the United States were not immune from the displeasing 
revenue consequences of a source tax-competitive battle for foreign 
investment. 
During the Anti-Avoidance Phase — to date, the last episode in 
this saga — nations recognized that (in light of growing obligations) 
the ongoing erosion of their income tax base was the major problem 
for the IITR. More specifically, they recognized that new dominant 
MNE actors in the global economy are able to exploit many of the 
IITR’s imperfections and incongruence to reduce tax liabilities. In 
response, governments attempted to amend the IITR to reverse tax 
erosion by promoting the concept of anti-avoidance, which aimed to 
filter legitimate from illegitimate transactions. The anti-avoidance 
paradigm was, nevertheless, a failure. Divisible, tax authorities do not 
have the enforcement resources to comprehensively audit the many 
Goliaths of an integrating global economy; nor do they have the 
conceptual foundations needed to coherently identify illegitimate 
transactions. 
The IITR was able to perform relatively well as long as cross-
border investments were FDIs made by foreign investors that were 
operationally distinguishable from the foreign corporations in which 
they invested. This also has to do with the imposition of residual 
residence taxes on foreign investors, which limited the rewards of 
source manipulation abuse. These premises acutely contrast with 
contemporary international cross-border investments, which involve 
increasing volumes of portfolio and affiliated investments, MNEs’ 
enhanced integration, and sovereigns’ growing inability and 
unwillingness to enforce residence taxation on MNEs. An aching 
fiscal void is therefore bound to materialize. 
Upon scrutiny, another pattern that emerges from this problem-
and-reaction history is an ongoing shift of the institutional frameworks 
in search of solutions. During the Revenue Phase, delineation of IITR 
BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC 4/14/2008  12:05 PM 
702 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  27:631 
sourcing conventions took place, primarily, on a multilateral level as 
the League attempted to establish agreed upon sourcing conventions. 
By the Trade Phase, the center of gravity shifted from multilateral to 
bilateral settings. This phase was marked by the impact of the Treaty, 
and the treaties that followed it, which attenuated the importance of 
multilateral arrangements (e.g., the model treaties). Though still 
significant for coordinating IITR norms, such multilateral institutional 
arrangements no longer serve as the trailblazers of the IITR. To some, 
it may seem as if, in many cases, the international arrangements have 
tended to follow the footsteps of norms established on the bilateral 
treaty network level, rather than originating these norms themselves. 
Towards the end of the Trade Phase and the beginning of the Anti-
Avoidance Phase, the center of gravity shifted again from the bilateral 
to the unilateral level, as nations began to both unilaterally compete 
for investments by reducing taxes and to prevent erosion by 
establishing unilateral anti-avoidance mechanisms. 
This change in the IITR’s institutional framework reflects a 
profounder development in the underlying tax allocation conflict that 
mobilized IITR policymakers in the different Phases. During the 
Revenue Phase and the beginning of the Trade Phase the underlying 
conflict was the allocation of revenues between capital-exporting 
countries and capital-importing countries. However, towards the end 
of the Trade Phase this distinction between capital-exporting and 
capital-importing countries became obscure. Hence, by the end of the 
Trade Phase the allocation problem transformed from being a 
problem of allocating revenues between different countries to an 
allocation conflict between sovereigns and international investors, 
primarily MNEs. Uncoordinated, countries tried, unilaterally and 
unsuccessfully, to advance a multi-objective tax policy of attracting 
foreign investments and countering avoidance. 
To the extent that this is the end of the story, then the ending is 
not a happy one. Divided, nations are ruled by sourcing conventions 
that originated years ago in response to business sector pressures. 
During the last eight decades, policymakers and scholars failed to 
anchor these conventions to any normative content that allowed 
sovereigns to structure durable IITR sourcing regimes. This is a major 
reason for concern due to the growing readiness among policymakers, 
in different jurisdictions, to shift to territorial tax regimes. If such a 
change indeed occurs, an alteration or elimination will likely occur to 
many of the residency safeguards on source stripping.226 This will bring 
 
 226 Section 864(e), (f) allocates some of the U.S. corporation’s interest deductions 
BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC 4/14/2008  12:05 PM 
2008] The Quest to Tax Interest Income in a Global Economy 703 
IITR’s sourcing conventions to the fore, forcing policymakers to deal 
directly with the challenges of allocating income between sovereigns. 
The article’s analysis questions whether these conventions are apt to 
meet such a heavy burden. 
B.  A Prologue 
Some indicators suggest new movements in the IITR 
policymaking regarding interest income sourcing conventions. Recent 
proposals to change the USESR,227 and changes in other earnings-
stripping regimes around the world,228 indicate that the IITR may be 
on the edge of a new Allocation Phase with regard to sourcing interest 
income. While no allocation doctrine has yet been delineated, those 
indicators suggest policymakers’ growing readiness to re-
conceptualize earnings-stripping regimes to disregard some of the 
fundamental cornerstones of the anti-avoidance approach. These 
earnings-stripping regimes base their interest disallowance rules on 
criteria that fail to distinguish between related and unrelated debt and 
foreign and domestic debt. 
A thorough discussion of these changes and the delineation of an 
alternative IITR sourcing regime are beyond the scope of this article. 
The need for a re-conceptualization of sourcing conventions is not 
self-evident. It may be the case that other tax bases (e.g., consumption 
or wage) will replace eventually the income base over the course of 
the 21st century. However, to the extent one believes in the 
maintenance of the income tax base, then in an integrating global 
economy, this requires a more robust set of sourcing conventions. A 
different study dealing with the principle features to which the 
Allocation Phase should evolve will address whether these 
developments do indeed mark a new phase in IITR sourcing 
 
against its foreign income to determine its maximum credit through an asset based 
formula. The effectiveness of this safeguard over the ability of U.S. tax resident 
MNEs to deduct interest payments against their U.S. sourced income may be reduced 
significantly in the case of a shift to a territorial system. This is because more of the 
income repatriating will take the form of exempt dividends rather than sale, royalty, 
and interest transactions that would still be subject to U.S. tax. 
 227 Boidman, supra note 180. 
 228 Markus Ernst, Toward a Level Playing Field for Thin Capitalization: German 
and U.S. Approaches, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 657 (Aug. 21, 2006) (discussing section 8a 
of the German Corporate Income Tax Code (Körperschaftsteuergesetz — KStG)); 
Richardson, Hanlon & Nethercott, supra note 192, at 50 (discussing the Australian 
and New Zealand earnings-stripping regimes); Smith & Dunmore, supra note 207 
(discussing the 1996 New Zealand earnings-stripping regime). 
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conventions. To efficiently source the proceeds of mobile financial 
investments, the sourcing conventions of this emerging phase will 
have to depart from the current prevalent classifications. Most 
notably, IITR conventions should depart from correlating the 
distinction between the abuse potential of affiliated and nonaffiliated 
transactions with that between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Instead, 
the sourcing conventions should distinguish between evasion 
prevention measures and a much more comprehensive set of 
formulary sourcing measures for assuring proper allocations of 
income derived by MNEs from (related and unrelated) financial 
transactions and assets. 
The article elaborates briefly on the principled axis of such a 
regime.229 Creating this principled basis is the first step in offering a 
viable alternative to the current amalgam of IITR’s arrangements 
(during its formulation in the Anti-Avoidance and Trade Phases). 
Others should view this principled basis as the inevitable conclusion of 
the article’s criticism of the IITR’s historical development presented 
throughout the analysis. 
The first theme that emerges from the article’s historical analysis 
is that one of the major challenges facing the Allocation Phase will be 
to delineate the institutional framework in which the IITR sourcing 
conventions should develop. Such a comprehensive framework should 
seek to provide better sourcing arrangements on the unilateral, 
multilateral, and (most importantly) bilateral levels. Since unilateral 
arrangements seem almost categorically insufficient and robust 
multilateral IITR sourcing arrangements considered almost utopian, 
the first principle of reform would have to address the substantive 
features of treaties and the manner by which they are formulated. 
This is not a simple task since, as the article has shown, the treaties’ 
decentralized network and flexible evolution came at the cost of a 
very cumbersome, over formalistic, obsolete, and incoherent body of 
law — one that is extremely difficult to negotiate and amend.230 
 
 229 Bird, supra note 66, at 756. 
 230 Tillinghast, supra note 81, at 455–57. The article mentions the following key 
points: (1) Treaties “are incredibly slow-moving creatures. They are time-consuming 
to negotiate and impossible to update on a regular basis”; (2) “The concepts 
embodied in the existing tax treaties . . . were largely conceived in the days of a ‘brick-
and-mortar’ industrial economy. . . . [for example] [r]ules designed to apply to the 
physical delivery of tangible goods or the provision of physical labor . . . do not always 
work well when applied to the delivery of software or on-line services. . . . the use of 
derivative financial instruments to bundle or unbundled economic interests, 
synthesize securities or confer the economic equivalent of the ownership of property 
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Furthermore, the treaties’ bilateral framework created many of the 
IITR’s structural anomalies because of its inability to encompass the 
multi-jurisdictional aspects of many transactions.231 This is most 
evident in the taxation of MNEs, in which the treaties’ bilateral 
solution spawns numerous tax avoidance opportunities.232 Moreover, 
lacking any normative base, the patchwork of treaties seemed to 
encourage and even legitimize trends of taxpayers’ tax avoidance and 
sovereigns’ tax competition. However, the article’s analysis also 
stresses that treaties may, nevertheless, be a wise policy alternative in 
a reality in which no multilateral tax agreement is foreseeable.233 In a 
world of low international tax cooperation, the outcomes of coherent 
and “correct” unilateral policies are likely to be turbulent and 
unpredictable, even if framed by competent and benevolent 
policymakers.234 Accordingly, at least in the short run, policymakers 
and academics should internalize “proper” sourcing arrangements in 
the treaty practice so as to make use of this powerful policymaking 
tool. 
The second and third principles emerge from the analysis of the 
USESR and its operation in post Trade Phase circumstances of low 
withholding taxes and weak notions of residency taxation. The second 
principle hence requires a change in the IITR’s emphasis from the 
classical shareholder corporate distinction to a related (transaction) 
 
without actually transferring that ownership raises treaty issues that require 
resolution”; and (3) Treaties’ distinction between debt and equity, for the purposes of 
withholding source taxes, is somewhat inconsistent with the exemption of income 
arising from derivative financial instruments. Id. These instruments could be used to 
create financial positions, which are equivalent to ownership over debt and equity 
resources. 
 231 Since it affects states that are not contracting parties to the bilateral treaty as 
well as other bilateral treaty obligations of the contracting states, no bilaterally-
agreed MNE taxation policy is likely to be systematically and comprehensively 
applied. This is true for the following reasons: First, no bilateral agreement can 
retroactively control provisions of former agreements made by either state, nor can 
one state adequately constrain the ability of another state from later entering into 
different treaty obligations. Second, a bilateral treaty cannot constrain the actions of 
third party states that, in a tax competitive environment, are likely to try to undercut 
any bilateral MNE tax policy in order to improve their own revenue collection. 
 232 Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1641, 1641–43 (2001); Whisenhunt, supra note 59, at 546–47. 
 233 Lebovitz & Seto, supra note 80, at 530. 
 234 Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of 
Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54 
TAX L. REV. 353, 408 (2001). 
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and nonrelated (transactions/corporate-setting) emphasis.235 This new 
emphasis should not aim to offer different anti-avoidance standards 
for related transactions. It should rather try to offer a categorical shift 
in how tax authorities perceive and tax MNEs. The emphasis on the 
distinction between affiliated and nonaffiliated transactions is a 
practical, rather than a conceptual, distinction. It is triggered by the 
harsh revenue implications of failing to tax MNEs and is therefore a 
natural upshot of the arm’s-length standard’s deficiencies. This article 
highlights this by questioning the validity of debt financing in 
affiliated settings where there is no “natural rivalry” between 
contractual parties to assure the integrity of the underlying 
transactions. 
The third, and perhaps most imperative, principle stresses that 
any sourcing regime of financial income will have to bridge some of 
the USESR’s discontinuities that emerge from capital’s fungiblity. As 
in other cases involving the taxation of financial instruments, 
discontinuities in the tax treatment of similar transactions arise 
because MNEs control the tax consequences of their financial flows 
within affiliated settings by engaging in financial engineering 
techniques to break, synthesize, re-package, and hybridize the legal 
form of their financial assets. They make use of this ability to 
manipulate between economically equivalent transactions to attain 
the most favorable tax result. Thus, MNEs are able to skew, 
contractually, the risks from the income and deductions associated 
with the holdings of their financial assets between their various 
subsidiaries. By striping the earnings of their subsidiaries located in 
high-tax jurisdictions, MNEs erode the source corporate tax base in 
those jurisdictions. In an era where international commerce and the 
role of MNEs in it are steadily growing, MNEs’ avoidance of source 
corporate income taxes is a serious threat to the integrity of the 
income tax. To deal with this problem, policymakers are required to 
disregard the legal form of MNEs’ internal financial flows. This 
requires tax authorities to establish alternative methods to allocate 
MNEs’ financial income on a net basis of the MNE as a whole and not 
to try and allocate the financial income of every one of its subsidiaries. 
Put differently, MNEs’ resiliency in re-classifying and re-assigning 
financial assets between their subsidiaries requires tax authorities to 
 
 235 Ault, supra note 11, at 569 (“[The OECD Model Treaty] recognizes the 
separate right of the source state to tax dividend income in the hands of the investor 
after imposing a corporate level tax on the profits from which the dividend is paid, as 
well as the right of the residence country to tax, after giving the appropriate double 
tax relief for the shareholder-level tax.”). 
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compute their “financial income” only with regard to financial 
contracts with unaffiliated parties. More specifically, this prescribes 
(1) a combined encapsulation of the earnings-stripping and the 
disproportionate leverage phenomena, (2) the elimination of the 
distinction between foreign and domestic debt, and (3) the elimination 
of any discontinuity in the tax treatment of debt/equity. This 
essentially entails some type of quasi-unitary consolidation of MNEs’ 
financial earnings and an appropriation formula to source them. 
The forth principle emerges from the article’s emphasis on the 
growing tendencies of tax evasion associated with portfolio 
investment. This principle suggests the need for more robust and 
efficient information sharing measures to assure residence tax on the 
proceeds of these investments. 
The present article lays out the platform for this advanced 
assessment, along with the treaty and statutory reform proposals it 
entails. 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
The interest income sourcing problem is both intriguing and 
important because it unfolds many core issues that influenced the 
development of the IITR. The original sin was the differential 
(domestic) tax treatment of debt and equity investments under 
classical corporate taxation. That problem was magnified as the 
income tax techniques used to tax and allocate the proceeds of 
international transactions employed different source tax treatments 
for debt and equity investments. In terms of revenues, and because 
MNEs may exploit jurisdictional mismatches through related setting 
manipulations, leaving these problems unsolved entails high stakes. 
Moreover, formulating a robust and well theorized set of sourcing 
conventions for financial investments is an acute necessity as the 
winds of change calling for territoriality develop. 
The derivative of this article’s analysis is the following: tax 
policymakers and academics face two important tasks with regard to 
the source tax treatment of income from financial investments. First, 
on the conceptual level, a well theorized notion of source precedent in 
levying income taxes, as well as an inquiry as to what comprises a “fair 
(source) return” for debt investments, must be established. 
Second, on a more practical level, a mechanism that re-imposes 
national fiscal sovereignty on MNEs using affiliated settings to exploit 
jurisdictional mismatches, as well as to avoid source taxation, must be 
devised. 
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Addressing both objectives is feasible and should be pursued as 
the IITR advances into a novel Allocation Phase in the coming 
decades. 
 
